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THE KILLING FIELDS: REDUCING THE CASUALTIES IN
THE BATTLE BETWEEN U.S. SPECIES PROTECTION
LAW AND U.S. PESTICIDE LAW
Mary Jane Angelo*
For the past 35 years, the conflicting goals, standards, focuses, and methods of
United States species protection laws and United States pesticide law have produced
a fierce legal battle. The unwitting casualties of this battle are the millions of birds,
fish, and other wildlife that have been killed, and the hundreds of protected species
put at risk of extinction. This battle has intensified in recent years, as environmental
organizations have sued the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") for its continued failure to comply with the Endangered Species Act
("ESA ). In response, EPA has invoked numerous legal and regulatory strategies,
becoming further entrenched in its position of non-compliance. EPA 's reluctance to
conform to the ESA is due in part to its institutional bias in favor of registering
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA "),
and its generic bureaucratic inertia. A significant cause of the non-compliance,
however, is the catch-22 in which EPA finds itself due to inherent conflicts between
FIFRA and the ESA.
This Article begins by describing the extent of the harm to wildlife, including
threatened and endangered species, caused by current pesticide usage and EPA's
failure to comply with wildlife protection laws. After providing an overview of the
major federal species protection statutes, this Article chronicles the historic tension
between those statutes, discussing the resulting litigation, EPA's regulatory actions
and inaction, and the legislative response. The picture that emerges is one of un-
resolved crisis and massive noncompliance with federal mandates. The Article then
turns to examine the sources of tension between the statutes: their conflicting goals,
standards, geographic and temporal focuses, and risk reduction methods. Based on
this exposition of the fundamental tensions, the Article concludes by suggesting leg-
islative reforms intended to eliminate or at least alleviate the conflict and to recon-
cile the goals of wildlife protection and availability of socially useful pesticides.
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"There was a strange stillness. The birds, for example - where
had they gone?"'
I. THE PROBLEM
Perhaps the anthem of the 1970s environmental movement, Big Yellow
Taxi ("Hey farmer, farmer put away that DDT now. Give me spots on my
apples, but leave me the birds and the bees. Please!"), 2 should have made a
more ambitious request. Although EPA banned or severely restricted the use
of DDT3 and other bio-accumulating pesticides in the 1970s and 1980s, the
substitutes employed in their absence have resulted in ecological devastation
of their own. Despite the ban of the much-maligned DDT, the fear of a
silent spring - a spring without the sounds of birds - remains a reality.
In the decades since the ban of DDT and its relatives, pesticides have
caused the deaths of literally millions of birds, fish, and other wildlife, and
have placed hundreds of threatened and endangered species at risk of extinc-
' RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 2 (1962).
2 JONI MrrCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON, Reprise Records (1970).
3 "DDT" stands for dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, but "DDT" is commonly used to
refer to mixtures containing isomers and breakdown products. Its pesticidal attributes were
first recognized in 1942, and DDT was used to control insect-borne diseases, such as typhus,
during World War II. Later, it was used extensively to control mosquitoes that carry malaria
and as a popular agricultural insecticide. Pesticide Action Network UK, 40 Pesticide News 18
(1998), available at http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/actives/ddt.htm.
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tion. Unfortunately, the laws governing pesticides conflict in a number of
significant ways with the laws designed to protect wildlife, including
threatened and endangered species. The laws differ dramatically in their
goals, standards, focuses, and methods, creating barriers to compliance with
species protection laws that the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), the agency charged with implementing the pesticide laws,
has been unwilling or unable to overcome. These conflicting laws are par-
ticularly problematic when combined with EPA's institutional bias in favor
of approving pesticide use under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act ("FIFRA"), its generic bureaucratic inertia, and the recent ad-
ministration's hostility towards species protection. These factors have
pushed EPA into a position of defensive entrenchment and regulatory paraly-
sis, resulting in a failure to comply meaningfully with species protection
law. The unwitting casualties are the countless species - including
threatened and endangered species - that EPA's failings have placed in
harm's way.
Although the legal wrangling over the pesticide/species protection con-
flict has simmered for decades, the battle has intensified in the past several
years. Recently, a number of environmental organizations sued EPA for its
failure to comply with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). In response to
these suits, EPA has invoked numerous legal defenses and become even
more entrenched in its position of non-compliance. All three branches of the
federal government have entered the fray: the judiciary attempting to resolve
the conflict between species protection and pesticide laws, the executive
agencies trying to regulate their way out of ESA compliance, and Congress
attempting to dismiss the problem by exempting pesticide decisions from the
ESA. Furthermore, in July 2007, the Supreme Court, in reviewing EPA's
determination of whether to approve a state program under the Clean Water
Act, ruled that a federal agency need not undergo the consultation process
provided for in section 7 of the ESA unless its action is a discretionary one
that allows consideration of factors other than those explicitly mandated.4
Although this holding, discussed in greater detail below, is not likely to be
interpreted as eliminating the requirement for EPA to comply with section 7
in its FIFRA decision-making, it has added another level of complexity to
the ESA/FIFRA relationship.
This Article examines the tension between species protection and pesti-
cide laws, as well as the legal battle that tension has produced. Part II de-
scribes the extent of the harm to wildlife, including threatened and
endangered species, caused by current pesticide usage. Part III provides an
overview of the major federal species protection and pesticide statutes. Part
IV chronicles the historical tension between those statutes, discussing the
resulting litigation, EPA's regulatory actions and inaction, and the legislative
response. The picture that emerges is one of an unresolved crisis and mas-
' Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2536-37 (2007).
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sive noncompliance with federal mandates. Part V examines the sources of
tension between the statutes: their conflicting goals, standards, geographic
and temporal focuses, and risk reduction methods. Based on this explana-
tion of the fundamental tension, Part VI suggests legislative reforms in-
tended to eliminate or at least alleviate the conflict and reconcile the goals of
wildlife protection and availability of socially useful pesticides.
II. THE CASUALTIES
As with many major environmental reforms, the banning of DDT and
other organo-chlorine pesticides occurred in response to public pressure over
a particularly visible and acute environmental crisis. In that case, the crisis
was eggshell thinning and other effects on avian raptors caused by DDT,
which threatened the extinction of a number of species, including the Ameri-
can Bald Eagle, our national bird.' DDT and its chemical relatives undergo
a phenomenon known as bioaccumulation, in which the chemical concentra-
tion increases dramatically in the higher levels of the food chain, resulting in
substantial harms to top-of-the-food-chain predators such as carnivorous
birds.6 The pesticide ban was crucial to the rebound of raptor populations
and was hailed as an environmental success story.7 In order to compensate
for the ban, farmers and public health control agencies (such as mosquito
control boards) began using other pesticides, chiefly organophosphates and
carbamates.8 Although these types of pesticides do not bioaccumulate or
persist in the environment for long periods like DDT, they raise new and
equally troubling consequences. 9
Organophosphate pesticides ("organophosphates") were first devel-
oped as biological warfare agents (nerve gas) during World War II. These
substances were well-suited as biological warfare agents because they are
quick-acting neurological poisons in mammals, including humans. Like-
wise, they act rapidly to kill insects and other pest species. Accordingly, it
soon became apparent that these substances could be used to control a wide
range of pests. However, due to their high acute toxicity, organophosphates
actually pose a greater immediate threat to humans, fish, and wildlife than
5 See David Pimentel et al., Assessment of Environmental and Economic Impacts of Pesti-
cide Use, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 47, 67 (David
Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, eds., 1993); Clive A. Edwards, The Impact of Pesticides on the
Environment, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS, supra, at
13, 27.
6 See Edwards, supra note 5, at 14, 27.
7 See id. at 27; Pimentel, supra note 5, at 67.
See Edwards, supra note 5, at 27.
9 Extension Toxicology Network, Pesticide Information Profiles, http://extoxnet.orst.edu/
pips/parathio.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law
Review).
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do many of the organo-chlorines such as DDT. ° Many organophosphates
kill rapidly upon contact, whether through ingestion, breathing, or mere skin
exposure. " I
Despite longstanding knowledge of their risks, organophosphates be-
came the pesticides of choice after DDT's cancellation, and have remained
the most widely used chemical pesticides in the United States. Given their
potentially extreme toxicity, the large quantities released into the environ-
ment each year, and the fact that these pesticides are used with the express
purpose of killing and/or disrupting living organisms, it is not surprising that
threats to wildlife remain.
When DDT was cancelled in 1972, EPA was aware of the trade-off
between its bio-accumulating effects and the acute toxicity concerns of the
primary chemical pesticide alternative, organophosphates. In EPA's final
cancellation order, the EPA Administrator stated:
The risk-benefit equation is a dynamic one. Timing is a variable in
that equation. What may, in the long run, be necessary to protect
the environment could be a short-term threat to human health.
This is exactly the case before me now. The benefits of using
organophosphates are a long-range benefit and the risks of DDT
result from continued long-term use. In the very short run, how-
ever, the equation balances out very differently."
Although the EPA Administrator recognized that the ecological effects of
organophosphates were more profound than those of DDT in the short run,
he found that such effects could be minimized by prudent use, such as not
applying organophosphates in known nesting areas of rare birds. 3 In the 35
years since the Administrator's statement, such risk minimization measures
have yet to be implemented.
Several recent studies suggest that the bans on DDT and other organo-
chlorines have not ended the pesticide threat. In 2004, the Center for Bio-
logical Diversity ("CBD") issued a report concluding that EPA-approved
pesticides currently are putting more than 375 threatened and endangered
species at risk. 14 The report summarizes the existing data on pesticide-re-
lated harm to aquatic life, birds, and other wildlife, including protected spe-
cies. 5 It also describes the problems associated with pesticide-contaminated
10 DDT, http://www.pan-uk.org/pestnews/actives/ddt.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (com-
paring the acute toxicities of DDT and of the organophosphate Parathion) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
" Extension Toxicology Network, supra note 9 (describing long-term effects of parathion
on humans and a variety of animals).
12 In re Stevens Indus., I E.A.D. 9 (EPA 1972) (Consolidated DDT hearings).
13 Id.
14 BRIAN LITMANS & JEFF MILLER, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, SILENT SPRING
REVISITED: PESTICIDE USE AND ENDANGERED SPECIES (2004), available at http://www.bio-
logicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/ [hereinafter "CBD Report"].
15 ld. at 6-9, 16-44.
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waterways, soils, and biota, as well as pesticide spray drift.' 6 The report also
includes a detailed description of the endocrine-disrupting effects associated
with many pesticides. 7
The CBD is not alone in its concerns over pesticide impact on wildlife.
For example, the American Bird Conservancy estimates that of the 672 mil-
lion birds that are directly exposed to pesticides each year, more than 67
million will die as a result. 8 Fish, bird and other wildlife poisonings from
exposure to pesticides are fairly frequent and widespread. 9 One database
tracking pesticide-related bird mortality lists over 400,000 reported deaths
caused by 4,000 pesticide poisoning incidents. 20 Due to known underreport-
ing of bird deaths, actual mortality from pesticide poisonings probably is
substantially greater.2' The organophosphate and carbamate pesticides ap-
pear to be the greatest cause of these deaths. 2
In addition, the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA")
has warned of an "impending pollinator crisis," due in part to pesticide
use. 23 Pollinators at risk include commercial bees and a number of wild pol-
linators, including wild bees and various bird and bat pollinators.2 4 A num-
ber of other studies reveal substantial risks and a lack of full understanding
regarding the extent of pesticide risks to wildlife. 25
16 Id. at 1-5.
17 1d. at 10-15.
8 American Bird Conservancy, Pesticides and Birds Campaign, http//:www.abcbirds.org/
pesticides/pesticideindex.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmen-
tal Law Review). This estimate is supported by work conducted by Dr. David Pimentel, who
has reported a conservative estimate of 67 million bird deaths per year from agricultural pesti-
cide use. Pimentel, supra note 5, at 68.
"9 See American Bird Conservatory, The Avian Incident Monitoring System ("AIMS"),
http://www.abcbirds.org/aims/reportjlist.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review). AIMS is a cooperative program between the American
Bird Conservancy and EPA. The AIMS database tracks incidents of pesticide exposure affect-
ing wild birds.20 ld.
2! See Pimentel, supra note 5, at 66. Bird deaths are underreported for a number of rea-
sons. First, sick or dying birds typically fly away from the area where they were poisoned and
often seek shelter in a hidden location. Second, bird carcasses are quickly carried away by
predators and scavengers. Finally, humans often fail to report deaths, either because they are
not aware that there is reason to do so or to avoid potential legal liability for contributing to the
bird death.
22 See Edwards, supra note 5, at 27; Pimentel, supra note 5, at 66.
3 CBD Report, supra note 14, at 17.
24 See Pimentel, supra note 5, at 58-60.
25 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Blus & Charles J. Henny, Field Studies on Pesticides and Birds:
Unexpected and Unique Relations, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1125-32 (1997) (finding
shortcomings with existing field testing of pesticides on birds and unexpected toxic effects and
routes of exposure of certain organophosphate pesticides); Andrew Ogram & Yun Cheng, Fi-
nal Report: Biological Breakdown of Pesticides in Lake Apopka North Shore Restoration Area
Soil in a Mesocosm Experiment, St. Johns River Water Management District Special Publica-
tion SJ2007-SPI (2007) (demonstrating the complexity of pesticide breakdown in soils and
under a variety of conditions); see also J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274-93, 337-38 (2000) (describing the environ-
mental hazards of the farming industry, the consequences of pesticide use, and the lack of
strong environmental regulation of agriculture).
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In sum, despite the cancellation of DDT and its relatives in the 1970s
and 80s, pesticides continue to pose significant risks to birds and other wild-
life. The pesticides that replaced the banned organo-chlorines, while not
bio-accumulating, are more acutely toxic. Consequently, large numbers of
animals, including threatened and endangered species, continue to be ad-
versely affected by the use of EPA-approved pesticides.
III. THE STATUTES
The substantial harm to wildlife from legal pesticide use is attributable,
at least in part, to the fact that pesticide regulation and wildlife protection are
addressed through very different laws and administered by different agen-
cies. The primary federal pesticide law, FIFRA, is a licensing law with con-
sumer protection origins administered by EPA. The primary wildlife
protection statute, the ESA, on the other hand, focuses primarily on prohibit-
ing acts that cause harm to protected species, and is administered through the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS"; together, "the Services"). To appreciate the
tension between these statutes, it is important to understand their basic
structures.
A. The Endangered Species Act
The federal government currently lists 1,882 species as endangered or
threatened.26 The primary vehicle for the protection of these species is the
ESA,27 recognized by many sources as "the most comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation. 28
The statute's purpose is to conserve threatened and endangered species and
their habitats, for which it employs several regulatory mechanisms.2 9
"Endangered species" are those in danger of extinction throughout all
or a significant portion of their range.30 "Threatened species" are those
likely to become endangered "within the foreseeable future."'" Although
26 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Threatened and Endangered Species System Summary
of Listed Species, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/Boxscore.do (last visited Oct. 1, 2007) (on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
27 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
2" Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)
(quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)). In recent years, there has been
considerable debate over whether the ESA is too restrictive, and whether it interferes unrea-
sonably with private property rights. See Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuc-
cino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 441, 455 (2004) (arguing that the push for ESA reform has been
sold primarily on the basis of individual stories of nightmarish regulatory burdens on small
landowners).
29 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).30 Id. § 1532(6).
3' Id. § 1532(20).
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the statute distinguishes between these categories, species designated as ei-
ther are, for the most part, subject to the same protections. In addition to
listing species as threatened or endangered, the Services also designate criti-
cal habitat for each listed species. 32
Once a species is designated as either threatened or endangered, several
protections apply. First, section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "taking" of
listed species. The statute defines the term "take" broadly to include to
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or
attempt to engage in any such conduct."33 The Supreme Court has upheld
the Services' interpretation of the term "harm" to include acts that involve
"significant habitat modification or degradation where [the act] kills or in-
jures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, includ-
ing breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 3 4 Penalties for violations of the section
9 take prohibition vary depending on whether the violation involves a
threatened or an endangered species and whether the perpetrator violated the
prohibition knowingly.35 In addition, courts may award injunctive relief to
prevent the taking from continuing.
Because the prohibition on takings applies to "any person," a federal
agency that directly kills or injures a listed species, for example by destroy-
ing an active nest during a federal construction project, would incur section
9 liability. The more complicated issue is the extent to which agencies are
liable for takings that occur as a result not of the agency's own action, but
through a party acting with authorization from the agency. Although in this
situation liability will depend on the precise circumstances of the authoriza-
tion, courts have generally found federal regulatory agencies liable for au-
thorizing activities that resulted in takes. For example, a Massachusetts state
agency that issued licenses to use specific fishing gear was liable for taking
endangered right whales when the gear entangled the whales.36 In another
case, described in greater detail below, EPA was liable for allowing a pesti-
cide to be marketed that was eventually ingested by endangered black-footed
ferrets.37
The second major regulatory vehicle under the ESA is found in section
7.13 The statute provides that federal agencies are required to use their ex-
isting authorities to conserve endangered and threatened species.39 Addition-
ally, section 7 mandates that federal agencies consult with the Services to
"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is
32 Id. § 1532(5) (defining critical habitat as the areas essential to the conservation of a
species that may require special management considerations).33 Id. § 1532(19).
3' Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995).
31 Violations can result in both civil and criminal liability, including penalties of up to
$50,000 and imprisonment for up to one year for knowing takes of endangered species. 16
U.S.C. § 1540(b).
36 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (Ist Cir. 1997).
37 Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
18 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
39 1d. § 1536(a)(1).
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not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical habitat] of such species. '40 Federal agency action will "jeopardize
the continued existence" of a listed species where the action "reasonably
would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likeli-
hood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by
reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species."'4' The
section 7 consultation process applies to any federal agency action that "may
affect" listed species. The term "may affect" includes beneficial, as well as
adverse impacts. In the regulatory process established under section 7, the
determination of whether the Agency must engage in formal consultation
with the Services is based on whether action is "likely to adversely affect"
listed species. 41 If the Agency determines, with the written concurrence of
the Services, that the proposed action is "not likely to adversely affect"
listed species, the consultation process is terminated.43 If the Agency deter-
mines that the action is "likely to adversely affect" listed species, the
Agency must engage in the formal consultation process. 44
The formal consultation process typically involves considerable interac-
tion between the action agency and the Service, including evaluation of ex-
isting data and discussion of possible ways to reduce the likelihood of harm
to the protected species. The product of this consultation process is a Bio-
logical Opinion ("BiOp"), which states whether the proposed action is likely
to jeopardize listed species. If the Service concludes that the proposed
agency action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed spe-
cies, the Services include in the BiOp "reasonable and prudent alternatives"
that if implemented will avoid jeopardy.4 5 The Service may also include in
the BiOp an Incidental Take Statement ("ITS"), which identifies actions that
will not be considered prohibited takings and provides legal cover for harm
that does occur to species if addressed in the ITS.46 After the BiOp has been
issued, the agency decides whether to proceed. However, if the Agency's
action results in a take, the Agency will be liable under section 9, unless
such a take is provided for in the ITS.
B. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
In addition to the ESA, legislative authority for protecting wildlife is
found in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), which implements four
4
'ld. § 1536(a)(2).
41 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).42 Id. § 402.13.
4, Id. However, the FWS or NMFS will generally not provide an incidental take permit in
conjunction with a written concurrence, and the acting agency may still be liable for any takes.
"Id. § 402.13-14.
45 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
, Id.
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international treaties aimed at protecting migratory birds.47 The scope of the
MBTA is quite broad and has been said to cover "almost all native North
American birds. '48 Some, but not all, migratory birds covered by the MBTA
are also listed under the ESA.
As with the ESA, the MBTA prohibits takes, though the statute does
not define the term. However, regulations define it to mean to "pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" any of the listed species,
or to attempt to do so.49 The judicial scope of this definition is not clear.
One court found the language broad enough to include accidental poisoning
by discharging pesticide waste into a storage pond, 0 while in a more recent
decision another court determined that habitat modifications such as logging
activities are not included.51
Although the ESA and MBTA both apply to listed migratory bird spe-
cies and are similar in some respects, there are significant differences that
make each statute preferable in certain circumstances. The statutes are simi-
lar with regard to their prohibitions on takes. The MBTA's definition of
"take" appears to be narrower than the ESA's, which includes significant
habitat modification or degradation that kills or injures wildlife.5 2 However,
since the MBTA protects species before they near extinction, it can be uti-
lized more efficiently and quickly than the ESA (which requires a drawn-out
listing process for species already nearing extinction). 53
C. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
EPA is the agency primarily responsible for domestic pesticide regula-
tion, drawing its authority largely from FIFRA.54 Under FIFRA, all pesti-
4 Id. § 703. The Marine Mammal Protection Act provides the primary authority for pro-
tection of those species. Id. §§ 1361-1421h.
48 Larry Martin Corcoran and Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENY. U. L. REv.
359, 378 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, non-native species are not cov-
ered. Id. at 381-85.
4950 C.F.R. § 10.12.
50 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
5' Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
52 See, e.g., Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 47, 50-54 (2000) (arguing
that judicial interpretation has narrowed the scope of the act, creating a need for legislative and
regulatory expansion to counteract the threat posed by pesticides); see also Corcoran and
Colbourn, supra note 48 (providing a more detailed discussion of the MBTA, including its
history dating back to 1913). Corcoran and Colboum analyze one case in which a court spe-
cifically distinguished the anti-take provisions of the ESA from the MBTA, finding that the
MBTA's exclusion of the terms "harass" and "harm" from its "take" definition limited the
scope of the MBTA in comparison to the ESA. Id. at 390.
" See Erin C. Perkins, Comment, Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Rejuvenate America's National Environmental Policy, 92 Nw.
U. L. REV. 817, 841 (1998).
54 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2000).
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cides55 sold or distributed in the United States must be registered by EPA.16
A pesticide will be registered only if it will not cause any "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment,"57 defined as any "unreasonable risk to
man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and envi-
ronmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."" s Although not
expressly mandated by the statute, EPA has interpreted and applied this stan-
dard consistently as a cost-benefit balancing test under which it weighs the
risks associated with the use of a pesticide against the economic and social
benefits.5 9
Although the registration standard requires EPA to determine that the
pesticide "will perform its intended function" without unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment, FIFRA expressly states that EPA shall not make
any lack of essentiality a criterion for denying registration of any pesticide,
and that where two pesticides meet the requirements for registration, one
should not be registered in preference to the other. Accordingly, the availa-
bility of alternatives will not preclude registration. 60 Moreover, FIFRA ex-
pressly authorizes EPA to waive all data requirements pertaining to efficacy
and EPA has, by rule, done So. 6 I Thus, in making registration decisions, EPA
does not require any showing of the economic or social benefits to be de-
rived from the pesticide, but instead assumes that such benefits will accrue.
Although EPA does not require submission of efficacy data to support a
registration, it does require an applicant to submit risk-related data.6 2 Under
FIFRA, EPA may register products in certain situations even though all nec-
essary data have not yet been generated. Such a premature registration is
referred to as "conditional registration. ' 63 Conditional registration can be
used for (1) products with composition and proposed uses identical or sub-
stantially similar to currently registered pesticides; (2) products with pro-
S FIFRA provides that the term "pesticide" means "any substance ... intended for
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest ...." Id. § 136(u).
561d. § 136a(a).
" Id. § 136a(c)(5).
581d. § 136(bb).
5' A number of scholars have stated that, although Congress directed EPA to take eco-
nomic factors into account, it did not require that EPA conduct a strict cost-benefit analysis.
See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 29, 32 (2003); Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity,
and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33
ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 176-77, 182; WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 451-53
(2d ed. 1994) (noting that in light of FIFRA's legislative history, adverse effects were not
meant to be tolerated unless the pesticide provides some overriding benefit). Despite the ap-
parent intentions of Congress, EPA has interpreted FIFRA to require cost-benefit balancing,
and courts have upheld this interpretation. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Chapman Chemical Co., I E.A.D. 199 (EPA 1976); Proxtell Prods., 2 E.A.D.
854 (EPA 1989).
6o 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).
61 40 C.F.R. § 158.640(b)(1) (2006).
62 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(a), 136a(c)(2)(A). Data requirements are found at 40 C.F.R. § 158,
and provide for the submission of health and environmental effects data.
63 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7).
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posed new uses; or (3) certain products with a new active ingredient. 64 For
the first two cases, EPA must determine that despite the lacking data, ap-
proval of the conditional registration would not significantly increase the
risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.65 To issue a
conditional registration for new active ingredients, EPA must determine that
the use of the pesticide during the period of conditional registration will not
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment and that use of the
pesticide is in the public interest.66
The vast majority of EPA's data requirements under FIFRA relate to
human health effects,67 while those for wildlife and ecological effects are
quite limited. 68 EPA does require the submission of data designed to assess
the presence of widely distributed and persistent pesticides in the environ-
ment.6 9 However, EPA has very few data requirements related to actual
wildlife or ecosystems hazards. The wildlife data requirements, moreover,
only address acute toxicity in a few species and do not address chronic toxic-
ity or behavioral, neurological or reproductive effects. The wildlife and
aquatic organism data requirements include avian toxicity studies 70 and
freshwater fish and invertebrate acute toxicity studies7' for most pesticides.
Additional data are required only on a case-by-case basis depending on the
result of lower tier studies. Such conditional studies include mammalian
toxicity, avian reproduction, simulated and actual field testing of mammals
and birds, acute toxicity to estuarine and marine organisms, fish early life
stage, aquatic invertebrate life cycle, fish life cycle and aquatic organisms
64 Id.
651 Id. §§ 136a(c)(7)(A)-(B).
I Id. § 136a(c)(7)(C). Conditional registrations last a limited period of time as deter-
mined by EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 152.115(a), (b)(2).
67 These requirements include testing on residue chemistry to estimate human exposure to
pesticides, acute human hazard, subchronic human hazard, chronic human hazard, mutagenic-
ity, metabolism studies, reentry hazard, and spray drift evaluation, as well as oncogenicity,
teratogenicity, neurotoxicity, and reproductive effects in humans. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 158.202(a), 158.202(c), 158.202(e)-(g), 158.240, 158.390, 158.440 and 158.340. See also
id. § 158.34 (providing that certain human health effects data submitted to EPA must be flag-
ged as indicating potential adverse effects).
68 See Leslie W. Touart & Anthony F. Maciorowski, Information Needs for Pesticide Re-
gistration in the United States, 7 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1086-93 (1997) (describing and
evaluating EPA's ecological risk data requirements for pesticide registration).
6940 C.F.R. § 158.202(d)(1). These requirements include studies to determine the rate of
pesticide degradation; metabolism studies to determine the nature and availability of pesticides
to rotational crops and to aid in the evaluation of the persistence of a pesticide; mobility
studies pertaining to leaching, adsorption/desorption, and volatility of pesticides; dissipation
studies; and accumulation studies.
70 Avian oral LD50 and dietary LC50s (the concentration at which 50 percent of the test
animals die) are required when using the preferred test animal species, the mallard and the
bobwhite. Id. § 158.490.
" Freshwater fish LC50 studies are required, with the preferred test species being the
rainbow and bluegill fish, and acute LC50 studies are required on freshwater invertebrates,
with the preferred test species being Daphnia. Id.
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accumulation, and simulated or actual field testing of aquatic organisms for
most outdoor uses. 72
With regard to wildlife, EPA's main concern is with acute toxicity test-
ing, and it typically does not require data submission on the potential ad-
verse effects of pesticides on wildlife behavior, neurology, reproduction,
birth defects, or other non-acute effects. EPA's requirements contain no
studies evaluating effects on amphibians, reptiles, or other species not identi-
fied specifically in the rules. Although EPA requires acute toxicity testing
for honeybees and other pollinators if the proposed use will result in expo-
sure for those species, EPA does not have any data requirements related to
pollinator subacute feeding studies, non-target aquatic insects, or non-target
predatory or parasitic insects.73
Once EPA evaluates the data, it determines whether restrictions are nec-
essary to minimize risks sufficiently serious as to outweigh the pesticide's
benefits. However, EPA's ability to regulate pesticide use under FIFRA is
very limited. Unlike other environmental statutes, FIFRA does not establish
a permitting system for pesticide use. In fact, no EPA approval is required
prior to using a pesticide, whether by permit or any other mechanism, even
for very large scale usage. Consequently, geographical and temporal factors
are not evaluated under FIFRA prior to release of pesticides into the envi-
ronment. FIFRA's regulation of pesticide "use" is achieved through label-
ing restrictions. It is the registration applicant's responsibility to propose all
labeling with the registration application.7 4 All registered pesticide products
must bear a label or labeling containing precautionary statements, warnings,
directions for use, and an ingredient statement.75 All labels must state that it
is illegal to use the pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling, the
sole obligation placed on pesticide users by FIFRA. 76 Unfortunately, users
may not understand or be willing to follow the complex instructions. More-
over, it is virtually impossible for EPA to identify and monitor compliance
by all users of the country's thousands of registered pesticides.
Beyond the basic labeling requirements, FIFRA authorizes EPA to clas-
sify certain higher risk pesticides for restricted use if they would cause un-
72 d. § 158.490.
73 In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies these types of requirements with regard to
pollinator subacute feeding studies as "reserved pending development of test methodology,"
and with regard to non-target aquatic insects or non-target predatory or parasitic insects as
"reserved pending further evaluation to determine what and when data should be required, and
to develop appropriate test methods." Id. § 158.590.
74 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(C) (2000). Although EPA must approve labeling language, the
applicant - who presumably will prefer the least restrictive terms - proposes the language.
71 FIFRA defines the term "label" as the written, printed, or graphic material attached to a
pesticide, while "labeling" is defined more broadly to include all other material accompanying
the pesticide or to which reference is made on the label. Id. §§ 136(p)(l)-(2). A product
whose labeling does not contain the information required by EPA or which sets forth false or
misleading information is misbranded. See id. §§ 136(q) (defining the term "misbranded"),
136j(a)(1)(E) (providing it shall be unlawful for any person to sell or distribute an adulterated
or misbranded pesticide).
76 Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G).
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reasonable adverse effects on the environment in the absence of such
restrictions.77 A restricted use pesticide may be used only by or under the
supervision of a certified applicator, and may not be purchased by the gen-
eral public.78 Certification of applicators is primarily conducted by the
states, whose certification plans must conform to certain standards enumer-
ated in FIFRA.79 However, a restricted use designation is designed primarily
to protect the users themselves, and generally is not intended to address eco-
logical or wildlife risk reduction. Although EPA regulations require certified
applicators to possess general knowledge of potential environmental conse-
quences of pesticide use and misuse, they do not require knowledge of spe-
cific risk reduction techniques. On the other hand, the certification
requirements related to human health include, among other things, detailed
requirements for specific knowledge of precautions necessary to guard
against injury to applicators and other individuals in or near treated areas,
the need for and use of protective clothing and equipment, and the symptoms
of pesticide poisoning.80 Moreover, FIFRA provides explicitly that EPA
may not demand that state certification plans require individuals to receive
instruction on integrated pest management, a pest management approach de-
signed to reduce environmental impacts.8 In fact, certified applicators are
not even required to receive specialized training in local ecosystems and
their vulnerability to specific pesticides.8 2
The 1972 revisions to FIFRA mandated that EPA go back and reexam-
ine previously registered pesticides.8 3 Congress mandated this "re-registra-
tion" to ensure that previously registered pesticides met current standards
and that the data EPA had for these older pesticides was the same as that for
newer pesticides. EPA's re-registration efforts moved extremely slowly, and
as a result, in 1988 Congress imposed on EPA specific re-registration re-
quirements intended to improve both the pace and the nature of re-registra-
tion.84 These provisions establish a multi-phased process ensuring that
registrants submit required data for EPA review under current standards.
Failure to meet the prescribed deadlines may result in suspension or cancel-
lation of registration.8 5
" Id. § 136a(d)(I).78 Id.
" Id. § 136i. This section, regarding the use of restricted use pesticides, allows states to
develop certified applicator plans and submit them for EPA approval. EPA must approve these
plans so long as they designate a responsible state agency to administer; contain satisfactory
assurance that the agency has legal authority and sufficient personnel to do so; give assurances
that the state will devote adequate funds to the plan; provide for reports to EPA; and provide
assurances that the plan conforms to specified standards regarding certified applicators.
80 40 C.F.R. § 171.4(b)(ii) (2005).
8' 7 U.S.C. § 136i(c).
82 See RODGERS, supra note 59, at 462-63 (describing certified applicator training
programs).
83 7 U.S.C. § 136a-1.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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Once a pesticide is registered, EPA maintains the authority either to
cancel or suspend the existing registration based upon certain risk-benefit
determinations. The same standard applies for both initial registration and
cancellation,86 so cancellation is warranted only where new information or
changing circumstances demonstrate that a previously registered pesticide's
risks outweigh its benefits. Section 6(b) of FIFRA provides that EPA may
issue a notice of intent to cancel if a pesticide or its labeling does not comply
with FIFRA, or if the pesticide generally causes unreasonable adverse ef-
fects. 87 There are two types of cancellation actions under section 6(b). Sec-
tion 6(b)(l) authorizes EPA to issue a notice of intent to cancel or change
classification, and section 6(b)(2) authorizes EPA to issue a notice of intent
to hold a hearing to determine whether or not registration should be can-
celled or classification changed.88 Section 6(b)(2) is used when EPA'sjudg-
ment concerning the risks and benefits of a pesticide is only tentative.8 9
Regardless of the type of cancellation action, the standard for cancellation
requires risk-benefit balancing. Before taking final steps, EPA must con-
sider whether any unreasonable risks posed by a pesticide's use can be re-
duced sufficiently by other regulatory measures, such as additional labeling
or a restricted use classification. If sufficient risk reduction cannot be
achieved by such measures, the registration of the pesticide for that use must
be cancelled.90
In addition to cancellation, FIFRA authorizes EPA to suspend the regis-
tration of a pesticide based on certain findings.9' There are two types of
suspension proceedings. Ordinary suspension is used when necessary to
prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation pro-
ceedings.92 A suspension action merely addresses the risks and benefits for
the period involved, but it is not an ultimate resolution of the cancellation
issues.93 An emergency suspension order is effective immediately, and is
used when an emergency does not permit even an expedited hearing before
suspension takes place.94 The emergency order remains in effect until the
issuance of a final suspension order following the hearing. 95 Third parties do
86 Both 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (standard for registration) and § 136d(b) (standard for can-
cellation) use the "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" standard.87 Id. § 136d(b).
88 Id.8 9 There is no distinction between § 136d(b)(l) and § 136d(b)(2) hearings in the manner
of conduct, burden of proof, or the nature of the initial decision by an administrative law
judge.
90 EPA's refusal to initiate cancellation or suspension proceedings is a judicially review-
able final order. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, courts
have only reviewed about a third of the more than 60 pesticide cancellations and suspensions
that occurred prior to 1994. RODGERS, supra note 59, at 480.
91 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c).92 1d. § 136d(c)(1).
93 Id.
94 Id. § 136d(c)(3).
95 Id.
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not have a right to request or intervene in an expedited hearing.96 An emer-
gency suspension order is subject to immediate review by a District Court.9 7
In sum, the ESA and the MBTA establish absolutist prohibitions on
taking protected species. Moreover, the ESA mandates that federal agencies
undergo consultation to ensure that their actions do not cause jeopardy to
listed species. FIFRA, on the other hand, establishes a pesticide registration
process that is governed by a cost-benefit standard and that is generally more
concerned with human health than wildlife. Accordingly, the statutes, as
discussed in more detail below, conflict in significant ways, making compli-
ance with both wildlife protection statutes and FIFRA unwieldy and imprac-
tical at best.
IV. THE ONGOING TENSION
During the past several years, a number of reports and lawsuits have
highlighted the ongoing problem of pesticide use's impacts on wildlife, in-
cluding threatened and endangered species. The CBD's 2004 report criti-
cized EPA for "display[ing] a stunning lack of initiative in complying with
the [ESA]," and for having demonstrated a "reckless disregard for the im-
pact of its Pesticide Regulation Program on wildlife, and, most importantly,
on endangered species."9" The CBD maintained that because EPA registers
pesticides for use, the public assumes they are safe. 99 Due to FIFRA's struc-
ture and EPA's implementation methods, however, registration says little, if
anything, about a pesticide's safety. °00 The CBD report describes EPA's reg-
ulatory oversight of the pesticide industry as "abysmal" and opines that EPA
consistently has ignored sound science, as well as requests by the Services to
modify registrations to reduce wildlife impacts.' 0' The CBD report also de-
scribes EPA's institutional bias towards rushing pesticide registration before
the risks are understood fully, in order to get the pesticide on the market
faster.
This section describes the history of the tension between FIFRA and the
species protections laws. It starts by chronicling the history of litigation
over EPA's ongoing failure to comply with the species protection laws in its
FIFRA decision-making. Next, this section describes the regulatory actions
that EPA has taken, at times in an attempt to comply with the wildlife stat-
utes, and at times to avoid compliance. It concludes by discussing a recent
legislative attempt to, in essence, exempt FIFRA decision-making from ESA
requirements.
96 ld.
I7 ld. § 136d(c)(4).
98CBD Report, supra note 14, at 51.
9 9 
ld. at i.
1OO Id.
101 Id.
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A. The Litigation
EPA's failure to comply with wildlife protection statutes has led to a
spate of recent litigation. However, suits spawned by the tension between
pesticide regulation and species protection laws date back nearly thirty
years. Starting in the late 1970s, the federal government brought a number
of lawsuits involving pesticides' impact on protected species. The earliest
cases involved liability under the MBTA. In United States v. FMC Corp.,
the Second Circuit ruled that a violation of the MBTA could be predicated
on an intentional action, even without specific intent to kill protected
birds. 02 The Eastern District of California held similarly in a related case,
United States v. Corbin.'0 3
While both FMC and Corbin imposed liability, respectively, on a man-
ufacturer and user of pesticides for harm caused to protected species, neither
addressed whether EPA could be liable based on its own conduct in approv-
ing the registration of a pesticide that later harmed a protected species. It
was not until 1989 that a court addressed this issue in the landmark case
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA.' 4
In that case, the Eighth Circuit held EPA liable for a taking under sec-
tion 9 of the ESA for allowing the continued FIFRA registration of strych-
nine. EPA had reviewed the above-ground use of strychnine in the 1970s
and consulted with the FWS about the pesticide's impact on listed species. 05
The consultation resulted in a 1979 BiOp finding that the continued use of
strychnine would jeopardize listed species. 06 EPA initiated a cancellation
process for several registered uses of strychnine after environmental groups
intervened in the process, and discussions continued from 1984 until 1986.107
Most of the intervenors settled with EPA, but the Defenders of Wildlife and
Sierra Club refused, and along with the Friends of Animals, filed suit under
the ESA's citizen suit provision. 108
EPA argued that because the plaintiffs sought the cancellation of a pes-
ticide, the plaintiffs' suit had to be brought under FIFRA. 09 While the
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that an action solely for pesticide cancellation
should be sought under FIFRA, the court held that FIFRA did not permit
EPA to ignore the ESA when regulating pesticides."10 EPA did not dispute
02 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 904 (2d Cir. 1978) (pesticide manufacturer
found in violation of MBTA for releasing pesticide into storage pond where birds were ex-
posed and killed).
1o3 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978) (pesticide user found in violation of MBTA despite
lack of intent to kill migratory birds).
104 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
5 Id. at 1296-97.
1'6Id. at 1297.
17 Id. Defenders of Wildlife, the Sierra Club, the Farm Bureau, FWS, and USDA were
among the intervenors.
'o Id. at 1298. The ESA contains a citizen suit provision, which authorizes citizens to
bring civil suits to enforce provisions of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000).
"o Defenders of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1298.
"
0 Id. at 1299.
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that the distribution of strychnine had caused the death of endangered spe-
cies." ' Noting that the definition of a taking was quite broad and that distri-
bution of strychnine could only occur upon registration of the pesticide, the
court held that EPA action had caused the deaths of endangered species and
as a result, an illegal taking had occurred." 2
Although, as described in detail below, EPA had made some attempts
during the 1980s to comply with the ESA in its FIFRA decision-making,
those attempts were very limited. Unfortunately, the holding in Defenders of
Wildlife did little to prod EPA into compliance. During the 1990s, it ap-
peared that the Defenders of Wildlife holding had paralyzed EPA into inac-
tion. Nevertheless, it was not until the early 2000s that a number of
environmental organizations began to bring or threaten suit against EPA. "'
Although most of these cases settled, the cases in which the courts rendered
decisions demonstrate their frustration with EPA's noncompliance.
The current wave of litigation over the impact of pesticide use on pro-
tected species began in 2002, when 40 environmental organizations sent
EPA a Notice of Intent to Sue for ESA and MBTA violations connected with
EPA's registration of the pesticide fenthion." 4 FWS recommended that EPA
cancel existing registrations for fenthion immediately due to unreasonable
adverse effects posed to protected bird species.' 5 When EPA failed to take
action to reduce the risks, Defenders of Wildlife, the American Bird Conser-
vancy, and the Florida Wildlife Federation filed suit in federal district
court." '6 The case was rendered moot in 2003 when the manufacturer of
fenthion voluntarily canceled its registration.' '1 Despite the lack of a judicial
decision, the fact that environmental groups were able to obtain a cancella-
tion appeared to spur other organizations to bring similar suits.
Id. at 1301.
12 Id. EPA is not the only federal agency that has been reluctant to comply fully with
section 7. There has been an ongoing battle between environmental organizations and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") regarding FEMA's ESA obligations in
administering the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"). See Florida Key Deer v.
Brown, 364 F. Supp, 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (ruling that NFIP jeopardized several endan-
gered species), and 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (granting the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief against insurance policies for new developments in listed species' habitat).
"' Several recent suits targeted other federal agencies as well. See, e.g., Oregon Nat. Res.
Council v. Keys II, No. 02-3080-CO, 2004 WL 1048168, at *I (D. Or. May 7, 2004) (alleging
section 7 violations against the Bureau of Reclamation); San Juan Audubon Soc. v. Veneman,
153 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (alleging misuse of sodium cyanide ejectors approved by
EPA and used by the Department of Agriculture).
"' American Bird Conservancy, Environmental Groups Serve EPA with Notice to Sue
Over Bird Deaths (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/re-
leases/020129.html.
"I American Bird Conservancy, Groups Sue EPA to Protect Florida Wildlife from Bird-
Killing Pesticide (Oct. 28, 2002), available at http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/re-
leases/021028.html.
116 Id.
... See Fenthion: Product Registrations Cancellation Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,609-11 (Sept.
26, 2003). EPA approved the manufacturer's request to cancel fenthion in May 2003. See
Fenthion: Receipt of Request to Cancel Registrations, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,495-97 (May 30, 2003).
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In September 2004, environmentalists won a significant victory in
Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA," 8 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a
ruling finding a section 7 violation in EPA's failure to ensure that the regis-
tration of 54 pesticides would not jeopardize several listed salmon species.
The holding imposed detailed buffer zones restricting the use of more than
30 pesticides along listed salmon-supporting waters in California, Oregon,
and Washington." 9 Interestingly, the court imposed the kind of geographic
limitation that, as discussed below, EPA has continually resisted despite per-
sistent recommendations from the Services.
On appeal, EPA challenged the district court's decision to create
mandatory buffer zones for application of the specified pesticides and to
require written notifications accompanying pesticides sold in urban areas. 20
It argued that any action resulting in the cancellation or modification of a
pesticide's use must conform to FIFRA.'2 ' EPA primarily argued that it was
bound only to apply the provisions of FIFRA, which had its own statutory
language relating to endangered species.' As such, EPA argued that it did
not have independent duty under Section 7(a)(2) to consult with the FWS or
the NMFS. 123 Furthermore, EPA claimed that FIFRA's generic standard for
registration and cancellation, when read in conjunction with the ESA, al-
ready took into account any concerns that registration might affect listed
species. 2 4 EPA also sought a determination that the plaintiffs had not fully
exhausted their administrative remedies, 2 and that the district court should
have deferred to EPA as the agency with the necessary experience to fashion
appropriate orders on complex pesticide regulations. 2 6
118 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090 (2006).
H9 See Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, No. C01-0132C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29886 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 22, 2004) (order granting injunction). Patti Goldman, the attorney representing the
environmental organizations in the case, recommended to the judge buffers drawn from the
1989 BiOp. Earthjustice had surveyed all of the buffers for aquatic species from the old Bi-
Ops, and chose the buffers at the low end of the range. Earthjustice also surveyed county
bulletins for aquatic species in California, buffers in BiOps for forestry activities, and other
scientific evidence. The buffers are intended to be interim until consultation is complete. Patti
A. Goldman, Protecting Endangered Species From Pesticides: Making the ESA Work or Find-
ing Loopholes, SJ023 ALI-ABA *31, *34-*36 (ALI-ABA Conference, Sept. 18-19, 2003).
The Services had already evaluated the pesticides at issue and determined that use of these
buffers would avoid jeopardy. Brief for EPA at * 12-* 13, Wash. Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d
1024 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-35138, 04-35212, 04-35244), 2004 WL 1763203.
20 Brief for EPA at * 12-* 13, Washington Toxics.
121Id. at *14.
122 Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1031. Under 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(l)-(2) (2000), EPA
may suspend registration of a pesticide for an immediate hazard, which per § 136(l) can in-
clude its effect on endangered species. Id.
123 Id.
'" Brief for EPA at *14, Washington Toxics. EPA argued that although the ESA has a
citizen suit provision, it should not be read so as to provide citizen plaintiffs greater ability to
enjoin pesticide registration than EPA itself possessed. Id. at *15.
125 Id. at *15. EPA proposed that the citizen plaintiffs should have first petitioned EPA to
suspend registration of the offending active ingredients, and only upon an EPA decision on that
petition should a lawsuit have been allowed. Id.
126 Id. at *16, *27-*28.
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The Ninth Circuit rejected EPA's position, applying the Eighth Circuit's
Defenders of Wildlife logic and holding that FIFRA does not allow EPA to
exempt itself from the ESA, and that EPA must comply with the ESA if its
registration of pesticides will affect listed species. 27 The court held that
while the statutes have different purposes and calculations, EPA could not
avoid its duties under the ESA simply "because it is bound to comply with
another statute that has consistent, complementary objectives."'2 8 The court
also dismissed the argument that EPA lacked discretion to cancel registra-
tions except under the statutory requirements of FIFRA, and noted that a
plaintiff need not exhaust FIFRA remedies before seeking relief under an-
other statute. 29 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's injunctive relief,
noting that because it was the "maintenance of the 'status quo' that [was]
alleged to be harming the endangered species," the injunction was appropri-
ate pending EPA compliance with the ESA.130 Furthermore, the court placed
the burden of proof on EPA to show that its action was non-jeopardizing to
the listed species, finding that such burden-shifting was appropriate under
the ESA for agency actions that have violated Section 7(a)(2).' 3'
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Washington Toxics,
the Court recently decided another pivotal case with potential implications
for FIFRA. In National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 32 the Court addressed the consultation requirements of section 7 in con-
nection with a transfer of permitting authority to a state government under
section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). 33 EPA argued that section
402(b)'s mandatory nature prevented it from denying a state application
based on ESA considerations. It was not disputed that the state applicant
had met the nine specified criteria in section 402(b). The issue was whether
EPA was required to determine if, under section 7, its transfer decision
would jeopardize listed species, in essence adding a tenth criterion to the list
of nine required for a transfer under section 402(b) of the CWA. 34 In a 5-4
decision,'35 the Supreme Court held that EPA was not required to undergo
consultation in granting a permit transfer, because the decision to grant such
127 Washington Toxics, 413 F.3d at 1032.
2 Id. The court explained that "FIFRA utilizes a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that
there is no unreasonable risk created for people or the environment ... taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of a pesticide's use." The ESA, on the
other hand, "affords endangered species the 'highest of priorities' in assessing risks and bene-
fits." Id.
129 Id. at 1032-33.
130 1d. at 1035.
131 Id.
132 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
133 For further analysis of the case in this issue, see Katharine Mapes, Case Comment,
National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
263 (2008).
34 Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2525.
135 Id. at 2524. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
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a transfer is not a discretionary one. 3 6 Of significant importance to the ma-
jority was the fact that section 402(b) states that EPA "shall approve" a
transfer if each of the nine specified criteria are met.
Because section 3(c)(5) of FIFRA likewise provides that EPA "shall
register" a pesticide if the specified standards are met, it may appear at first
glance that under National Association of Homebuilders, compliance with
section 7 is not required when EPA makes a registration decision. There are
significant differences, however, in the requirements of section 402(b) of the
CWA and those of section 3(c)(5) of FIFRA. CWA section 402(b) specifies
an exclusive list of criteria that must be met for EPA to approve a transfer.
Each of these criteria relates solely to the issue of whether the state applying
for the transfer has the legal authority and other abilities to carry out the
permitting program.'37 These criteria do not relate to whether a transfer (or
permits issued under such a transfer) will jeopardize listed species. Thus,
the Court concluded that although EPA could exercise some discretion in
applying the criteria, it could not impose a completely new criterion address-
ing listed species impact to the exclusive list related to legal, administrative,
and procedural abilities,'38
The criteria in section 3(c)(5) of FIFRA, on the other hand, actually
require EPA to consider the effects of the registration decision on wildlife.
This section directs EPA to make a determination regarding whether a pesti-
cide will cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,"' 3 9 a term
the statute defines to include "all plants and man and other animals ... and
the interrelationships which exist among these."'' 40 Thus, by its very terms,
FIFRA section 3(c)(5) authorizes EPA to evaluate risks to "plants and ani-
mals," which inherently include threatened and endangered plants and ani-
mals. Although FIFRA uses the term "shall," the term is used to mandate
that EPA consider, among other things, the impacts on listed species. As the
Ninth Circuit noted in Washington Toxics Coalition, FIFRA's mandate to
consider effects on listed species is complimentary to the mandates of the
ESA.' 4' Thus, unlike the CWA provisions reviewed in National Association
of Homebuilders, under which ESA compliance would require a completely
new criterion to be added, the ESA's mandate to consider effects on listed
species is complementary to FIFRA's mandate.
Moreover, requiring EPA to undergo the section 7 consultation process
prior to making an unreasonable adverse effects determination under FIFRA
will provide the type of information and expertise of the Services that will
inform EPA's FIFRA decision-making. Indeed, informed decision-making is
one of the primary purposes of the consultation process. Accordingly, the
Court's rationale in National Association of Homebuilders would not appear
13 6 Id. at 2538.
'3 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
'3 See Nat'l Ass'n of Homebuilders, 127 S. Ct. at 2537.
1397 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (2000).
140 Id. § 136(j).
141 Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005).
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to extend to EPA's decisions under FIFRA section 3(c)(5), because unlike
EPA's decision-making under CWA section 402(b), under FIFRA not only is
EPA authorized to consider affects on plants and animals, it is required to do
so. The mere fact that FIFRA uses the term "shall" appears to be irrelevant
given the dramatically different mandates of CWA section 402(b) and those
of FIFRA section 3(c)(5). Therefore, although it is not yet clear how future
courts will interpret or apply National Association of Homebuilders to
FIFRA, it is unlikely that courts will find that the decision in any way obvi-
ates or alters EPA's requirement to comply with section 7 of the ESA when
making registration decisions. Thus, the Washington Toxics holding requir-
ing EPA to comply with ESA section 7 in FIFRA registrations appears to
remain good law. Further, under the 1989 Defenders of Wildlife case, EPA
continues to have potential section 9 liability for registering pesticides that
actually take listed species.
After its dramatic loss in Washington Toxics, EPA began settling suits
brought to force it to comply with section 7 in the FIFRA registration pro-
cess. 142 One such settlement occurred in 2005, in response to a lawsuit
brought by the CBD and the Save Our Springs Alliance alleging that EPA
violated both the consultation and anti-taking provisions of the ESA by reg-
istering six pesticides without reviewing potential negative effects on the
Barton Springs Salamander. 43 Under the terms of the settlement agreement,
EPA must determine effects on the salamander for the six pesticides accord-
ing to a specified schedule, evaluating whether the individual pesticides will
have no effect, possible but unlikely effects, or likely adverse effects, and
providing information to the FWS in the event of any likely adverse ef-
fects. 44 Other recent settlements with the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil and CBD contain similar provisions, requiring EPA to make effects
determinations for dozens of pesticides on many listed species. 45
141 Some settlements actually occurred prior to the court decision in Washington Toxics.
See, e.g., Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. EPA, No. COO-3150 CW (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(resulting in EPA's agreement to make "effects determinations" for approximately 20 pesti-
cides harmful to dozens of plant and salmon species by specified deadlines), Request for Pub-
lic Comment on Proposed Consent Decree Involving Pesticides and the Endangered Species
Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,232-01, 21,233 (April 30, 2002). See also Californians for Alternatives
to Toxics, http://www.alternatives2toxics.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review).
14" U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Signs Settlement Agreement Regarding
Endangered Species, http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/cb/csb-page/updates/es-settlement.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). The pesti-
cides in question were atrazine, diazinon, carabaryl, prometon, metoloachlor and simazine. In
the lawsuit, the plaintiffs specifically charged that EPA had failed to comply with the consulta-
tion requirements of sections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Center for Biological Diversity
vs. Johnson, No. l:04-cv-00126-CKK, Settlement Agreement, at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/cb/csb_page/updates/bartonsprings-agreemt.pdf.
144 Id.
145 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) v. EPA - EPA Signs Settlement Agreement Regarding Endangered Species, http://
www.epa.gov/oppfeadi/endanger/litstatus/NRDCsettlement fs.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review); U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Court Issues Stipulated Injunction Regarding Pesticides and the California Red-
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The foregoing discussion illustrates EPA's historic reluctance to comply
with the species protection statutes unless required by court order. To under-
stand the cause of this reluctance fully, however, it is necessary to examine
EPA's past failed attempts at compliance.
B. The Agency's Regulatory Action and Inaction
EPA's 35-year history with the ESA as applied to pesticide regulation
has not been a good one. Even after its judicial losses, however, EPA ap-
pears unable to find a workable way to comply with the wildlife protection
laws. This section describes the history of the agency's actions prior to and
following the recent litigation.
1. The Early Years (Prior to the 1989 Defenders Decision)
a. Early Consultations
Prior to 1989, EPA had yet to formulate an effective method for consul-
tation and review for potential pesticide threats to endangered species.'46
The agency's early attempts at meeting its section 7 obligations consisted of
case-by-case pesticide registration reviews for individual species. 41 This
process, however, was cumbersome, and in 1982 EPA instead initiated the
"cluster approach," where all pesticides with similar use patterns would be
considered together and the FWS would prepare a BiOp for all listed species
potentially impacted by the pesticides. 48 EPA began implementing this ap-
proach and in the early 1980s consulted with the Services on clusters includ-
ing the corn cluster, the small grain cluster, the forest cluster, the mosquito
larvicide cluster and the rangeland/pastureland cluster. 149 This process,
while quicker than the case-by-case method, suffered from problems of its
own. Specifically, minor uses for pesticides were not reviewed and a final
cluster package review took upwards of two to three years to complete. 150
More importantly, EPA failed to take action on the 1983 cluster BiOps.
legged Frog, http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/endanger/litstatus/redleg-frog/rlf.htm (last visited
Nov. 19, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
146Jim Serfis, Pesticide Regulation, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF EXTINCTION 214,
216-20 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991).
147 Id. at 216.
148Id. at 216-17.
1'9 In 1983, the Services issued BiOps for each cluster, making jeopardy determinations
for 21 listed species for the com cluster from one or more of 39 pesticides; 21 listed species for
the small grain cluster from one or more of 58 pesticides; 58 listed species for the forest cluster
from one or more of 23 pesticides; 77 listed species for the mosquito larvicide cluster from one
or more of 11 pesticides; and 159 listed species for the rangeland/pastureland cluster from one
or more of 32 pesticides. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Dep't of the Interior, Biological
Opinion 2-3 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 BiOp] (describing the BiOps issued six years earlier).
110 Serfis, supra note 146, at 217.
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b. The Creation of the ESPP
Although during the 1980s EPA did attempt to comply with section 7 of
the ESA, first on an individual case-by-case basis and later via the cluster
approach, a 1986 independent review of EPA's pesticide program found that
the agency did not comply with section 7 in one-third of all pesticide
cases. 5' In response to the review, EPA announced in 1987 that it would
seek full ESA compliance by addressing all restrictions for pesticides found
harmful to listed species, printing restrictions on product labels and supply-
ing information bulletins providing use instructions.'52 The proposal faced
considerable opposition from the agricultural sector and USDA, and Con-
gress delayed the program until 1988. 51 Due to congressional pressure and
agricultural lobbying, EPA had not adopted the program as of 1989. At that
time, the agency proposed instead a two-prong approach consisting of an
individual species-based (rather than pesticide cluster-based) review, focus-
ing on those species most in need of protection. This review could be fol-
lowed by a determination of the highest acceptable rate of pesticide exposure
for that species. 5 4 This approach was included in EPA's 1989 proposed En-
dangered Species Protection Program ("ESPP"), which was designed to es-
tablish a process for future consultations. 5
The proposed ESPP attempted to address risks to listed species by re-
quiring a label on each pesticide product instructing users to obtain and con-
sult with "county bulletins." These bulletins would be developed for each
county in the United States that contained listed species' habitat. The bulle-
tins were to consist of maps showing the location of the habitat and instruc-
tions on how to use pesticides properly to reduce risks to listed species. 15 6
The county bulletin program had many shortcomings. It was voluntary,
unenforceable, and depended on pesticide users taking the initiative to obtain
bulletins and comply with their recommendations. Before the Internet pro-
vided easy access to the bulletins, this was a cumbersome task that few, if
any, users would have undertaken. Most significantly, EPA's progress in
developing the bulletins was extremely slow, with bulletins for only one or
two species in very few counties in each state to date.' 57
'' Id. This review found that EPA had registered pesticides before receiving BiOps and
failed to implement recommended restrictions for harmful pesticides. Id.
152 ld. at 218.
'I ld. at 219.
I d. at 220. The greatest acceptable rate was the smallest amount that may affect a
listed species. Id.
' Endangered Species Protection Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,984, 27,988-89 (July 3,
1989). See also CBD Report, supra note 14, at 51.
'56 Endangered Species Protections Program, 54 Fed. Reg. at 27,990.
157 For example, in the state of Florida, which has more than 108 listed species residing in
the state, bulletins were developed for only three counties for only one species, the Florida
Torreya tree. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Pesticides: Endangered Species
Protection Program: Gadsden County, Flonda (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.epa.
gov/espp/florida/gadsd.htm. Similarly, for the State of Maryland, a bulletin was developed for
only one county for one species of fish.
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The county bulletin program neither enhanced species protection nor
complied with the ESA.55 Moreover, this program remained merely a "pro-
posal" throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, EPA stated
repeatedly that it would finalize the ESPP in the near future, but failed to
take any action on the program until 2002, when it issued a second proposed
ESPP, in response to the litigation of the early 2000s.
2. The Middle Years
a. The 1989 and 1993 BiOps
The 1986 internal review and the 1989 loss in Defenders of Wildlife
appeared to nudge EPA into action. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, EPA
consulted with the Services in two substantial cases, each involving a large
number of pesticides and potentially affected species. In the first case, EPA
reinitiated consultation on selected portions of five previous cluster BiOps.5 9
This consultation involved 112 pesticides, collectively affecting 165 listed
species. 160 The ten month process culminated in a major BiOp issued by
FWS in 1989. The 1989 BiOp superseded the 1983 cluster BiOps and made
a total of 1,867 jeopardy findings. 6'
Shortly after the 1989 BiOp, EPA initiated consultation lasting two
years on sixteen vertebrate control pesticides potentially affecting a number
of species. FWS's resulting 1993 BiOp made 189 jeopardy findings. 62 In
the 1989 and 1993 consultations alone, FWS made 2056 jeopardy find-
ings. 63 This overwhelming number of jeopardy findings seemed to paralyze
EPA. In the 1993 BiOp alone, FWS recommended over 165 reasonable and
58 See Goldman, supra note 119, at *34-*35 (discussing extensive formal consultation by
EPA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and EPA's subsequent disregard for the resulting mitiga-
tion requirements).
9 1989 BiOp, supra note 149. EPA's reasons for reinitiating consultation were
(1) reevaluation of the jeopardy posed to aquatic species by a selected group of
pesticides, based on new analyses of their estimated environmental concentrations;
(2) evaluation of pesticides that may affect four bird species listed since the [1983
BiOps] were completed; (3) reassessment of the potential exposure of certain spe-
cies to selected pesticides, based on biological and toxicological data; (4) considera-
tion of new reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid jeopardy to species
occurring solely or largely on Federal lands, and for the red-cockaded woodpecker
and the wood stork; (5) assessment of the potential for certain pesticides to indirectly
harm listed species through their food supply; [and] (6) consideration of withdraw-
ing or cancelling jeopardy opinions for pesticides that have been cancelled or
suspended.
Id. at 1-2.
160Id. at 5.
161 Id.
162 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Dep't of the Interior, Biological Opinion, March 1993:
Effects of 16 Vertebrate Control Agents on Threatened and Endangered Species 1-3 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 BiOp]. The potentially affected species included thirty mammal species,
fifteen bird species, nine reptile species, and one insect species.
'63 Detailed tables developed by the author showing the reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives for each of the jeopardy findings in these BiOps, as well as the incidental take authoriza-
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prudent alternatives for the various species/pesticide combinations; the 1989
BiOp provided a menu of approximately twenty reasonable alternatives,
most of which applied to many of the large numbers of pesticide/species
combinations.164 Examples include:
o Prohibit use of the chemical within 100 yards of the water's
edge for ground applications and 1/4 mile for aerial applications
at sites of known populations or within designated critical
habitat, whichever is larger.
" Prohibit use within a 1/2 mile radius of the species' occupied
habitat.
o Applicators of the listed jeopardy pesticides must limit their use
within all identified wood stork rookeries, including a buffer ex-
tending 8-12 miles from the rookery...
o Applicators of the listed forestry use pesticides will be required
to conduct a survey for red-cockaded woodpecker colonies prior
to using this pesticide in forests containing pine trees over 30
years old....
o After periods of heavy rains, as measured by surface water
(greater than 4 inches) within identified habitat, do not apply
chemical within a 100 yards radius of the known breeding sites
of the Puerto Rican crested toad. Restrictions shall remain in
place for no less than 25 days. 65
EPA did not seem to know how to translate information gleaned from
the 1989 and 1993 BiOps into regulatory restrictions that would reduce risks
to listed species. EPA's limited ability to regulate pesticide use, primarily
through label directions, was a poor vehicle for incorporating the large num-
ber of reasonable and prudent alternatives recommended in the BiOps.
While some label restrictions may be easily understood and followed by
users, others are very complex or require specialized knowledge or data,
such that it is unlikely that most pesticide users will be willing or able to
comply. FIFRA exacerbates these monitoring problems by failing to pro-
vide EPA with the authority to require permits or other advance notice of
pesticide applications. Among the questions EPA faced in responding to the
BiOps were: How would it incorporate the large number of complex reason-
able and prudent alternatives into label language? Could pesticide users re-
alistically be expected to read potentially dozens of pages of label language
and follow the restrictions when applying the pesticides? How would EPA
enforce these detailed label restrictions?
tions and reasonable and prudent measures, are on file with the author and the Harvard
Environmental Law Review.
"6 See generally 1993 BiOp, supra note 162 at 111-1 to 111-54; 1989 BiOp, supra note 149
at 11-4 to 11-7.
165 1989 BiOp, supra note 149, at 11-4.
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b. EPA's Failure to Implement the BiOps
EPA has failed to take any action to require compliance with the rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives recommended in the 1989 and 1993 BiOps.
My own research into regulatory actions taken on each pesticide for which
jeopardy opinions were issued in the BiOps revealed no actions taken to
implement the recommendations of the FWS to reduce risks to any affected
listed species. This conclusion is based in part on a detailed analysis of all
of the jeopardy opinions in the 1993 BiOp, tracing the regulatory decisions
on each pesticide for which one of the 189 jeopardy opinions were issued
from the date of the BiOp to the present. My research investigated (1)
whether EPA had cancelled, suspended, or limited any registration in re-
sponse to the jeopardy opinions; and (2) whether EPA had imposed any of
the reasonable and prudent alternatives recommended by the FWS as either a
label restriction or any other type of regulatory mechanism. This research
revealed that of the 189 jeopardy opinions and 165 reasonable and prudent
alternatives suggested in the 1993 BiOp, none resulted in EPA action in di-
rect response to the findings or suggestions in the BiOp. Similar conclusions
apply to the 1989 BiOp.1
66
Instead of imposing the suggested reasonable and prudent alternatives
as label restrictions or taking other regulatory action in response to the jeop-
ardy findings in the 1989 and 1993 BiOps, EPA has attempted repeatedly to
justify its failure to act by referring to the county bulletin program. For
example, in its Reregistration Eligibility Documents ("REDs") for the pesti-
cides found to cause jeopardy in the 1993 BiOp, EPA's sole acknowledge-
ment of the endangered species issue was to include in each RED the
following statement: "The Agency is not imposing label modifications at
this time through the RED. Rather, any requirements for product use modi-
fications will occur in the future under the Endangered Species Protection
166 Four of the pesticides that were evaluated in the 1989 BiOp have since been severely
restricted or banned by EPA: (1) granular carbofuran (severely restricted); (2) endrin (banned);
(3) EPN (banned); and (4) mevinphos (banned). See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Pesticides: Regulating Pesticides: UN PIC & U.S. PIC-Nominated Pesticides List (Oct. 29,
2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/intemational/piclist.htm. However, the tim-
ing and reasons given indicate that the BiOps were not the central impetus for these cancella-
tions. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ground Water and Drinking Water:
Technical Fact Sheet on Endrin (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwh/t-soc/en-
din.html (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007);
http://www.pesticideinfo.org/DetailProduct.jsp?REG NR=01010700041 &DISTNR=
033270 (last visited Nov. 19, 2007); http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrdl/reregistration/mevinphos/
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007); http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrdl/reregistration/carbofuran/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2007). The manufacturers of several other pesticides that were found to cause
jeopardy in the 1989 BiOp have voluntarily cancelled the registrations of such pesticides for
reasons that are not described in the public literature. These pesticides include Benomyl,
Ethion, Ethyl Parathion, Fenaminphos, Fonofos, Fenvalerate, and Isofenphos. Information re-
garding these voluntary cancellations can be viewed at U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Pesticides: Regulating Pesticides: Pesticide Product Label System (PPLS) (Nov. 6, 2007),
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/pestlabels/index.htm [hereinafter Pesticide Product Label
System].
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Program." 167 Similar statements are included in the REDs for the pesticides
found to pose jeopardy in the 1989 BiOp. 6 8 EPA has not reinitiated consul-
tation with the Services prior to issuing the REDs to evaluate any new infor-
mation or changed circumstances that may have occurred during the almost
twenty years since the previous consultations occurred and to impose label
restrictions based on such consultations. Instead, EPA continues to rely on
its future implementation of the ESPP and its plans to require additional data
at some point in the future. As described above, the county bulletin program
is virtually non-existent, addressing few species and counties, leaving it to
the user to decide whether or not to obtain the bulletins and follow their
instructions. Although, as discussed below, EPA has once again attempted
to revive the ESPP, EPA has not made any significant progress in imple-
menting the program and still has only developed a very few bulletins for a
very few species and counties.
Despite EPA's evident inaction, it is worth noting that the agency has
taken certain limited regulatory actions based on risks to wildlife, though not
directly in response to recommendations of the Services. However, these
actions represent only a small step in relation to the many thousands of pesti-
cides and affected species currently in EPA's charge. In fact, the only re-
ported judicial or administrative decision in which EPA took regulatory
action based primarily on risks to wildlife was Ciba Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 169
in which EPA proposed cancelling certain uses of the pesticide diazinon on
golf courses and turf grass due to the risk posed to wild birds. 170 During the
1980s and 1990s, EPA considered canceling other pesticides based on risks
to wildlife, but failed to take any significant action.
In 1991, EPA proposed canceling the registration for ethyl parathion,
due to human and wildlife risks posed by its high acute toxicity. EPA ulti-
mately accepted a settlement with the manufacturer cancelling only the
167 See EPA, Interim Reregistration decision for Fenthion (2001), available at http://www.
epa.gov/oppsrrdl/REDs/0290ired.pdf. The REDs, including those for the pesticides evaluated
in the 1993 BiOp, can be viewed at Pesticide Product Label System, supra note 166.
'68 The REDs for all of the pesticides found to pose jeopardy in the 1993 BiOp were
issued during the period from 1991-1998. The development of the REDs for the pesticides
found to cause jeopardy in the 1989 BiOp occurred over a much longer period of time. Of the
ninety-five pesticides for which jeopardy determinations were made, REDs have been issued
for approximately seventy-two over a period ranging from 1991 to late 2007. Based on a
review of these REDs, it appears that during the 1990s, EPA included an endangered species
statement similar to the one used for the 1993 BiOp pesticides, which merely indicated that
EPA would address the ESA concerns in the future under the proposed ESPP. For the REDs
issued in the 2000s, EPA began to add language to the endangered species statement that
indicates that the information regarding risks to endangered species in the REDs is considered
"screening level assessment" that does not constitute a "may affect" finding under the EPA
and that EPA will be requiring additional data to further characterize and refine its ecological
and endangered species risk assessment. The REDs, including those for the pesticides evalu-
ated in the 1989 BiOp, can be viewed at id.
169 874 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1989).
170 Id. at 278. The Fifth Circuit held that FIFRA gave the EPA Administrator discretion to
conclude that recurring bird kills are an unreasonable adverse environmental effect regardless
of whether they significantly reduce bird populations. Id.
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ground application uses of the pesticide, which posed significant risks to
farm workers. The settlement did not address aerial application of the pesti-
cide, which posed the greatest risks to birds and other wildlife due to spray
drift associated with this form of application. 7 ' Despite the fact that ethyl
parathion had been implicated in the deaths of thousands of birds, EPA de-
clined to take regulatory action to address these risks. Ultimately, in 2001,
the manufacturer of ethyl parathion voluntarily cancelled the registration re-
lating to the remaining uses of the pesticide, after a concerted campaign led
by the American Bird Conservancy in partnership with Defenders of Wild-
life, the Pesticide Action Network, and the World Wildlife Fund.
72
EPA entered into a 1991 settlement that phased out the use of the granu-
lar form of the pesticide carbofuran, which was thought to have caused the
deaths of many birds.'73 However, EPA continued to allow the use of the
liquid form of the pesticide, which had been equally responsible for wide-
spread bird mortality. 174 In August 2006, EPA published its Interim RED for
carbofuran, in which EPA announced its intention to cancel all uses of
carbofuran due to both ecological and occupational risks, as well as human
health risks from residues on food and in water. EPA has announced that it
intends to issue a Notice of Intent to Cancel carbofuran registrations and has
requested that its Scientific Advisory Panel review its underlying scientific
assumptions. 17
Equally disturbing as EPA's failure to take action to reduce risks as
recommended by the Services in the 1989 and 1993 BiOps is the fact that
since 1993, EPA has not completed any formal consultations with the Ser-
vices, and has rarely even initiated consultation unless explicitly required by
court order or as part of a settlement agreement.176 These failures led ulti-
mately to the rash of lawsuits against EPA in the early 2000s for its failure to
comply with section 7 of the ESA.
'M' See Ethyl Parathion Receipt of Requests for Cancellation, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,061, 65,069
(Dec. 13, 1991); Ethyl Parathion, Amendment of Cancellation Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 3500 (Jan.
29, 1992); Ethyl Parathion, Correction to the Amended Cancellation Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 6168
(Feb. 20, 1992).
17 Ethyl Parathion; Notice of Use Cancellations, 66 Fed. Reg. 47,667 (Sept. 13, 2001).
173 Pierre Mineau, Birds and Pesticides: Are Pesticide Regulatory Decisions Consistent
with the Protection Afforded Migratory Bird Species Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act?, 28
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 313, 322 (2004).
'74 See id.
'71 The panel was planning to hold a meeting to conduct such a review in February 2008.
FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel: Notice of Public Meeting, 72 Fed. Reg. 22,612 (Dec. 6,
2007).
176 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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3. The Recent Years (Responses to the Litigation of the
Early 2000s)
a. The Resurrection of the ESPP
As described above, in the past several years, EPA has come under
increasing criticism for is failure to fulfill its obligations under the ESA. 177
EPA makes a large number of regulatory decisions regarding pesticides
every year. Currently, there are approximately 20,000 registered pesticide
product formulations, containing approximately 675 active ingredients and
1,835 other ingredients. Approximately 470 of the 675 active ingredients
are used in agriculture. 78 In a typical year, EPA makes hundreds of signifi-
cant regulatory decisions regarding pesticide registration. For example, in
2003 alone, EPA registered thirty-one new pesticide active ingredients, ap-
proved 334 new uses of previously registered active ingredients on over
1,500 different crops, and issued more than 6,500 more minor registrations.
During this same time period, EPA also completed re-registration assess-
ments on twenty-eight registered active ingredients, and processed nearly
500 emergency exemption requests. 79 Since the 1993 BiOp, EPA has not
initiated any formal consultations, whatsoever, on any of thousands of regis-
trations or other FIFRA regulatory decisions, unless required by court order
or settlement agreement. Instead, EPA continues to rely on the never-final-
ized ESPP program, including the limited voluntary county bulletin
program.
In December 2002, EPA revived its ESPP by filing a notice of its pro-
posed implementation in the Federal Register. 180 The 2002 proposal was in
essence a reiteration of the 1989 program, which EPA never finalized. 'he
proposed plan described how EPA would register pesticides under F1FRA
and how the Agency would balance the interests of its responsibilities under
the ESA and the desire to avoid "unnecessary burden" on farmers and pesti-
cide users. 8 ' The notice primarily discussed EPA's quantitative testing ap-
proaches undertaken in a pesticide registration process, including both
exposure tests and toxicity tests on listed species. 8 2
77 See Goldman, supra note 119; Mineau, supra note 173. See also Marcilynn A. Burke,
Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and
Why it (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENvmn. L. & POL'Y F. 441. 487-491 (2004) (discussing a
number of regulatory attempts to weaken the consultation process including with regard to
pesticide registration).
178 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF THE ECOLOGICAL RISK As-
SESSMENT PROCESS IN THE OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS 7 (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/endanger/consultationlecorisk-overview.pdf [hereinafter EN-
DANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES EFFECTS DETERMINATIONS].
17' Endangered Species Protection Program Field Implementation, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,549
(Dec. 2, 2002).
18o Id.
181 Id. ,182 Id. at 71,553-71,554.
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Another major focus of the notice was the revival of the county bulletin
program, in which EPA announced that it would develop and update county
bulletins and would post them on its website.18 3 EPA announced that it
would develop bulletins with the assistance of the FWS, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"), USDA, states and tribes, and
would issue bulletins only for counties in which such measures were consid-
ered necessary.8 4 Bulletins would specifically identify (1) the listed species
of concern, (2) pesticides that may harm the listed species, (3) the protection
measures for that species as well as any habitat information, and (4) a county
map indicating where pesticide usage should be modified from its standard
use.'85 The county bulletins would be designed to inform the public of pesti-
cide application limitations in their community. 6 An interested pesticide
user would review the county bulletins, which are available on EPA's web-
site, and check for any use restrictions or boundary requirements for pesti-
cide application. 181
In addition to changing the substantive aspects of the bulletins, EPA
proposed modifying pesticide labels to encourage users to follow the infor-
mation contained within the county bulletin.'88 The modified label would
also reference the effect the pesticide could have on listed species and how
the user could obtain the relevant county bulletin. 89 Interestingly, label
statements that would be amended would not be county-specific, but would
simply reference the potential harms to listed species and guide the user to
the particularized county bulletin to find information for his county. 90 Un-
fortunately, given EPA's poor track record in developing and updating
county bulletins over the past nineteen years, EPA's reiteration of this pro-
gram in its 2002 proposal did little to comfort those concerned with protect-
ing listed species from pesticides.' 9'
b. The Amendment to the Services' Rule
The litigation and increased public concern over EPA's ongoing failure
to comply with the ESA in its FIFRA decision-making prompted the execu-
tive branch to attempt to amend the joint regulations for consultation under
section 7 of the ESA to eliminate the need for EPA to consult the Services.
On August 5, 2004, the Services and EPA issued a final rule regarding con-
I83 id. at 71,558.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Pesticides: Endangered Species Protection Program: Endangered Species Protection
Bulletins (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/endangerbulletins.htm.
187 67 Fed. Reg. 71,549, 71,558-59.
18 8 Id.
119 Id. at 71,559.
190Id.
191 CBD Report, supra note 14, at 52-53. The CBD Report outlines several other short-
comings of the 2002 ESPP, including EPA's misinterpretation of its duties under the ESA and
its general institutional lack of concern for listed species.
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sultation practices among the Services and EPA for pesticide registrations. 9 2
The purported rationale for the rule was to provide a more efficient approach
to making decisions on whether new pesticides will "adversely affect" a
listed species.'93 Because the "Services believe that EPA's expertise in eco-
logical risk assessments of pesticides, together with the safeguards built into
the alternative consultation agreement, make case-by-case discussions and
written concurrences in EPA's [not likely to adversely affect ("NLAA")]
determinations ... unnecessary for FIFRA actions," there would be no for-
mal consultation for any FIFRA actions that EPA determines are not likely
to adversely affect any endangered species. 94 Under the new rule, EPA
would perform its own ESA analysis for NLAA determination purposes.
Once EPA made its NLAA determination, the analysis would be complete,
and there would be no role for the Services to second-guess the decision.' 95
If EPA concluded that the FIFRA action was likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any listed species or its critical habitat, the agency would
prepare an effects determination (made with the assistance of a Services rep-
resentative); this effects determination would serve as a functional
equivalent to the biological opinion that the Services normally provide. 196 At
that point, the relevant Service would review the determination and could
adopt it, modify it, or provide its own biological opinion laying out reasona-
ble and prudent alternatives available to EPA.'97 In effect, the rule would
allow EPA to bypass consultation if it concluded the pesticide regulatory
decision was "not likely to adversely affect" a listed species; if EPA con-
cluded that a regulatory action was "likely to effect" a listed species, EPA
could, in essence, write the BiOps which the Services could adopt or modify.
c. The Environmentalists' Response
The new rule was widely criticized by environmental organizations.' s9
The primary criticism of the rule was the provision for an upfront approval
by the Services of EPA's determinations without any oversight for the deci-
sion. Critics argued that EPA staff did not possess the necessary expertise to
make effects determinations without input from the Services. ,99 Further, the
idea of allowing EPA to conduct a review of the effects a pesticide would
192 Joint Counterpart Endangered Species Action Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69
Fed. Reg. 47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004).
193 Id. at 47,736.
194 Id. at 47,737.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 47,738
197 Id.
98 See Goldman, supra note 119, at *62-*72; CBD Report, supra note 14, at 10-11; Wash.
Toxics Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (Washington
Toxics 11). See also CBD Report, supra note 14, at 58 ("Unsurprisingly, the proposed rule and
the new ESPP were strongly advocated for by the FIFRA Endangered Species Task Force
(FESTF), a committee composed of fourteen agro-chemical companies.").
199 CBD Report, supra note 14, at 58. Indeed, the Services have been critical of EPA's
scientific approaches in the consultation process.
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have on listed species was criticized, given that history has routinely shown
that the FWS and NMFS have been critical of EPA's scientific approaches in
the consulation process. Environmental organizations feared that the new
rule would undercut the ESA and put listed species at greater risk. Conse-
quently, a number of organizations filed suit, alleging that the new rule vio-
lated the ESA. A court in the Western District of Washington found several
provisions of the new rule inconsistent with the mandates of section 7 in
Washington Toxics Coalition v. U.S. Department of Interior (Washington
Toxics II).200 Specifically, the court invalidated the provisions of the new
rule regarding the process by which EPA would make NLAA determina-
tions, finding these provisions to be arbitrary and capricious.20' The court
found that these portions of the rule were facially inconsistent with section 7,
and therefore could not survive a Chevron step one test.202 Moreover, the
court found overwhelming evidence that in promulgating the rule, the Ser-
vices did not comply with their own ESA section 7 obligations to avoid
jeopardy to listed species. 203 As of the writing of this Article, an appeal of
the district court's ruling on the challenge to the new rule was pending
before the Ninth Circuit.20
d. The Ecological Risk Assessment Process
In 2004, EPA published a document described as an overview of its
Ecological Risk Assessment Process.205 As described in this document,
EPA's ecological risk assessment process begins with a Screening-Level
Risk Assessment to evaluate a substance's potential impact on non-target
organisms, including listed species. If the screening-level risk assessment
indicates that a pesticide "may potentially impact, either directly or indi-
rectly, listed species or critical habitat," a species and habitat-specific eco-
logical risk assessment is conducted.20 6 "The result of these steps is an
effects determination that the pesticide will have 'no effect,' 'may affect but
20 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158.
201 Id. at 1200.
202 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron
sets forth a two-step test for reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute. Under step one,
a court will give effect to Congressional interpretation if Congress has spoken to the precise
question at issue.
203 Washington Toxics 11, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. Shortly after the 2006 Washington
Toxics H1 ruling, the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld challenges to ESA
regulations promulgated by the Services that would establish a similar consultation process for
the National Fire Plan regulatory actions. Defenders of Wildlife v. Kempthome, No. 04-
1230(GK), 2006 WL 2844232 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006). For a complete analysis of both cases
and the distinct approaches taken by each court, see Cynthia A. Drew, Beyond Delegated
Authority: The Counterpart Endangered Species Act Consultation Regulations, 37 ENVmL. L.
REP. 10,483 (2007).
204 Wash. Toxics Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Nos. 06-35873, 06-35891, 06-35899 (9th
Cit. filed Oct. 17, 2006).
205 ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES EFFECTS DETERMINATIONS, supra note 178.
2 06 Id. at 65.
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is not likely to adversely affect the species or critical habitat,' or 'may ad-
versely affect the species or critical habitat.' "207
Under this approach, apparently only when EPA makes a "likely to
adversely affect" determination will it pursue consultation with the Ser-
vices. 20 8 As described above, however, ESA section 7 and its implementing
regulations require consultation of some form whenever an action "may af-
fect" a listed species, not only when a likely to adversely affect determina-
tion is made by the action agency. It is not clear how the risk assessment
process relates to the consultation process, because the risk assessment docu-
ment does not acknowledge any role for the expert input of the Services.
Also, while the risk assessment document sets up an extremely complex
methodology for assessing effects on wildlife, it does not amend the data
requirements to require registrants or applicants to develop or submit more
comprehensive or better data on wildlife effects. Another shortcoming of
EPA's ecological risk assessment process is that it focuses solely on the im-
pacts to the organisms themselves and does not address impacts to habitat
that indirectly affect wildlife species. 20 9
Thus, EPA's ecological risk assessment process appears to be one more
attempt to circumvent ESA section 7 compliance by providing that EPA,
without consultation with the Services, will make the determination of
whether the use of the pesticide "may affect" the listed species, "is not
likely to adversely affect the listed species," or "is likely to affect the listed
species."
e. EPA's Latest Efforts
EPA's most recent effort to explain the ESPP occurred on November 2,
2005, when it published a notice in the Federal Register describing how the
ESPP will be implemented in the field.210 EPA describes its goal as meeting
its responsibilities under FIFRA in compliance with the ESA and without
unnecessarily burdening pesticide users."' EPA's plan is not a legally bind-
ing regulation, and the Agency may decide to change it at any time without
notice and comment.212
Under the plan, some pesticide actions, such as indoor products deter-
minations and emergency exemptions under section 18 of FIFRA, are poten-
tially excluded from the scope of the ESPP.2 13 "EPA's overall strategy is to
address listed species concerns within the context of the pesticide registra-
tion, re-registration, and registration review processes. '214 An effects deter-
207 Id. at 66.
208 Id. at 73.
209 CBD Report, supra note 14, at 54.
21' Endangered Species Protection Program Field Implementation, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,392
(Nov. 2, 2005).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 66,398-99.
214 Id. at 66,399.
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mination based on "EPA's assessment of a pesticide use's potential effects to
listed species" is generally conducted to support the registration status of a
pesticide. 2 5
Endangered Species Protection Bulletins ("Bulletins") will be used to
implement changes to a pesticide's use when necessary to protect a listed
species in a geographically specific area.216 Bulletins will be implemented
on a county scale. Information provided in the Bulletins includes the iden-
tity of the species of concern, the name of the active ingredient(s) to which
the limitations apply, a description of the use limitation, a county map show-
ing the specific geographic area to which the use limitations apply, and a
picture and description of the species when it would not cause further threat
to the species. There are also voluntary county bulletins that have been de-
veloped from past consultations available to pesticide applicators." 7
The pesticide label language that will be used when geographically spe-
cific use language is necessary to protect listed species will include the fol-
lowing at the beginning of the product's Directions for Use:
"ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. '218 EPA
intends to make bulletins available six months before they go into effect.
Applicators are required to use bulletins in effect the month in which they
will be applying the pesticide. 219 EPA intends to treat the bulletins just as any
other label provision in terms of enforcement. 220 The misuse and misbrand-
ing provisions of FIFRA, as well as liability under section 9 of the ESA, will
apply to pesticide users who fail to follow the applicable label provisions. In
terms of monitoring, EPA will continue to use existing monitoring data from
risk assessments, the U.S. Geological Survey, information provided under
the Clean Water and Safe Drinking Water Acts, and information from state
or tribal monitoring programs. 221 "EPA also intends to develop a process for
monitoring the effectiveness of Bulletins after the Program has been in effect
for some time. 222
Finally, EPA's defeat in Washington Toxics Coalition, along with the
settlements of a number of lawsuits, seem to have prodded EPA to initiate at
least some ESA consultations. Since 2004, EPA has issued 87 effects deter-
minations, all resulting from court orders or settlements. Of these, it has
made fifty-four total "likely to adversely affect" findings triggering consul-
215 Id. See also ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES EFFECTS DETERMINATIONS,
supra note 205.
2"6 70 Fed. Reg. at 66,400. This program, while focusing on ESPP implementation in the
field, is largely the same as risk assessment phase ESPP implementation.
217 Id. Access to the bulletins will be provided at www.epa.gov/espp or 1-800-447-3813.
21
8 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 66,401.
221 Id. at 66,402.
222 Id.
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tation with the Services, in addition to twenty-eight consultations required
by court order . 2 3 To date, no consultations have been completed.
The Services have not yet issued jeopardy opinions for these recent
consultations and EPA still has not implemented risk reduction measures on
any pesticides to reduce harm to listed species. Despite the loss in Washing-
ton Toxics I, the only risk reduction action EPA has taken in response is to
require that a "Point of Sale Notification" be distributed in retail stores that
sell the pesticides subject to the Order. This notice is merely a one page
flyer with a photograph of salmon, which states: "Salmon Hazard: This
product contains pesticides that may harm salmon or steelhead. Use of this
product in urban areas can pollute salmon streams. This Notice was pro-
duced in compliance with a January 22, 2004 Court Order, to notify urban
users about the potential for some pesticides to harm fish. ",224 EPA has not
even imposed this statement as a label requirement for the pesticides in-
volved. In addition, EPA has not taken any action to provide similar notifi-
cation to large-scale non-urban pesticide users, who in all likelihood are
applying larger quantities of pesticides in geographic locales that put a
greater number of fish at risk.
In conclusion, given EPA's long history of non-compliance with the
ESA, its recent decision to resurrect the old ESPP as its means of compli-
ance does not appear to move it much further towards compliance than it
was in the 1980s. Even EPA's recent plan for implementing the ESPP does
not instill confidence that it will be able to achieve ESA compliance. It is
difficult to understand how EPA believes it can make decisions regarding
how to implement the ESPP in the field when it has yet to obtain a single
BiOp since 1993. Without such a BiOp, how can EPA predict what reasona-
ble and prudent alternatives the Services will recommend? Without such
recommendations, how can EPA determine the best way to implement these
recommendations in the field? Once again, EPA does not appear to be tak-
ing its ESA responsibilities seriously, and merely seems to be seeking some
form of legal or political cover. Moreover, old shortcomings with the
county bulletin approach continue to exist. Although today the Internet
makes it easier for pesticide users to find county bulletins, there is still a
significant likelihood that many users will not understand or be willing to
read the label, understand that they must consult county bulletins, go to the
website, find the appropriate bulletins, and properly comply. The more steps
required of users, the less likely they will fully comply. Without some form
223 I have compiled a table of all of the pesticides for which EPA has made, or is in the
process of making effects determinations or consulting with the Services. The table shows the
status of the pesticide, the registered use, the toxicity level, whether the pesticide is subject to a
court order, the effects determinations made, what the effects determinations are based on and
the status of each of the consultations. The data is based on the EPA website on "effects
determination," http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl /endangerflitstatus/effects/index.htm. The table
is on file with the author and with the Harvard Environmental Law Review.
224 Washington Toxics Coal. v. EPA, No. C01-0132C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29886
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2004) (order granting injunction). The urban warnings apply only to a
subset of the pesticide that was detected frequently in urban salmon streams.
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of oversight to ensure that users are obtaining the proper bulletins, properly
interpreting them, and actually following the instructions in the field, non-
compliance remains likely. Perhaps most disturbing is the all too familiar
slow pace at which the agencies are acting to carry out the consultation pro-
cess. The Services, as well as EPA, appear to have gotten bogged down in
scientific minutiae and bureaucracy and have failed to make any meaningful
progress in protecting the species themselves. To move forward, the agen-
cies will need some clear congressional direction on how to proceed in a
manner that reconciles the conflicts between the statutes, and sets forth a
clear path for agency action.
C. The Legislative Response
The ongoing thirty-five-year battle between FIFRA and species protec-
tion laws, which led to the flood of litigation starting in 2002, drew the
attention of members of Congress concerned with what they perceived as the
overly broad mandate of the ESA as it relates to private property rights. In
response to these concerns, the House of Representatives, led by Congress-
man Richard Pombo (R-CA), passed the Threatened and Endangered Species
Recovery Act of 2005.225 The new legislation would have dramatically al-
tered several provisions of the 1973 Act, including a requirement that the
government pay private landowners if FWS regulations limit development
plans as well as changes in the method of species listing. 26 Most signifi-
cantly as relates to this Article, however, section 20 of the House bill would
provide that any agency action in compliance with FIFRA would also be
deemed to be in compliance with the ESA. 227 Such a change at the legisla-
tive level would remove all FIFRA-related registration questions from the
consultation requirements of Section 7(a)(2) and would presumably make
the recent rule changes and subsequent lawsuits under Section 7(a)(2) moot.
Environmental groups were united in their strong opposition to the bill,
which was characterized as an "all-out assault" on the ESA and an "unmiti-
gated disaster for endangered wildlife. '228 After the House passage of the
Pombo Bill, it languished in the Senate, where Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment and Public Works - Fish, Wildlife and Water Subcommittee Chair
225 H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. (2005).
226 Id.
227 Id. at § 20(a), p. 81. A report entitled "'Implementation of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973," submitted to the House Committee on Resources provides some insight into the
various amendments to the ESA. RICHARD POMBO, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT OF 1973, (unpublished report to the H. Comm. on Resources) available at http://
www.waterchat.com/Features/Archive/050517-ESA-Implementation-Report.pdf. The report
discusses the "success rate" of the ESA in terms of de-listings of species versus the cost
imposed by listing and critical habitat designations. Id. at 3. The report also criticizes the
scientific uncertainty of listings, and the recovery priorities set by the FWS despite the actual
probability of recovery. Id. at 3, 6.
228 See Bob Irvin, Pombo's "All-OutAssault", SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 22, 2006, available
at http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/opinion/story/1 4 2 17 6 0 7 p-1 5043607c.html.
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Lincoln Chafee (R-RI) and minority Committee members including Hillary
Rodham Clinton (D-NY) and Barack Obama (D-IL) opposed the passage of
the Bill. With the Democratic takeover of the Congress in the fall of 2006
and Representative Pombo's failed 2006 re-election campaign, the Bill ap-
pears to be dead, at least for the time being. Nevertheless, controversy over
the ESA and a variety of efforts to reauthorize the Act continue.
V. THE SOURCES OF TENSION
EPA's failure to comply with the ESA is not surprising given that the
conflicting goals, standards, areas of focus, and risk reduction mechanisms
of the two statutes, create a situation in which compliance is difficult. As a
result, EPA has implemented its pesticide program in a manner that has led it
to abdicate its ESA responsibilities.
A. Conflicting Goals
To understand the conflicts between the ESA and FIFRA fully, it is
helpful to consider the political and historic atmosphere in which each stat-
ute was enacted. The ESA emerged during the early rise of the environmen-
tal movement, against a backdrop of intense public concern over the health
of the environment and the dwindling populations of many wildlife species.
During the 1960s, two modest attempts to protect endangered species were
enacted by Congress.22 9 Congress passed the more comprehensive ESA in
1973 with a clear objective to "act early enough to save a vanishing spe-
cies. '230 The ESA sought ambitiously to conserve, protect and encourage
propagation of endangered species through federal action and the encourage-
ment of similar programs at the state level.231 Unfortunately, neither the stat-
ute nor the legislative history provides detailed guidance on the section 7
consultation process. 232 Although the Senate report provided analysis of the
consultation requirements, it did not elaborate or provide further insight as to
what "steps [are required] to 'insure that actions authorized, funded or car-
ried out' by it do not jeopardize the continued existence of any such spe-
cies. 1 33 Similarly, one of the few ESA sections not discussed in the
Conference Report was section 7, and as a result there is little guidance from
either the House or Senate as to its requirements.2 3 Nevertheless, there was
229 The 1966 precursor to the ESA was limited to establishing a federal program for con-
servation and providing for species protection on federally-owned land. S. COMMERCE
COMM., S. REP. No. 93-307, at 2 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990. The
1969 precursor to the ESA focused on banning the importation of endangered species or en-
dangered species' products. Id. at 2, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2991. These early Acts, although
important in their own right, did not satisfy the public desire for strong species protection.230 Id. at 3, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2991.
231 Id. at 1, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2989-90.
232 Id.
213 Id. at 9, 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2997.
24 H.R. CONF. REP. 93-740 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3001.
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evidence in the legislative history that the ESA was intended to "substan-
tially amplify the obligation" of federal agencies to carry out the purposes of
the Act.235 Moreover, the Supreme Court has interpreted the legislative his-
tory of section 7 of the ESA as giving greater importance to the protection of
species than other agency missions.236 Thus, although the ESA can and has
been interpreted as providing aggressive protections, Congress's exact intent
was not articulated clearly at the time of passage.
Unlike the ESA, the 1972 FIFRA amendments, which form the back-
bone of the current FIFRA, were not enacted as a new freestanding environ-
mental protection initiative. Instead, the amendments were an attempt to
impose an environmental component on a sixty-year old statute, the Insecti-
cide Act of 1910,237 designed to protect consumers from ineffective insecti-
cide products and fraudulent claims about such products. Environmental
concerns did not play any role in the 1910 Act or its amendment in 1947. In
fact, when President Truman signed the 1947 legislation, 23 8 the New York
Times described it as a law to "color poisons. '23 9 At the time of its passage,
the primary groups concerned about pesticides were farmers (whose interests
in government were advocated by the USDA). Passage of the Act and the
1947 amendments was uncontroversial in large part because there were few
opponents, and much less well-organized opponents, of the concept of wide-
spread pesticide application.2 40
Pesticide regulatory reform moved slowly, partially as a result of the
makeup of the primary regulating congressional committees.24' Of particular
importance was James Whitten, who chaired the subcommittee on agricul-
tural appropriations for the House Appropriations Committee.2 42 Whitten
was called the "Permanent Secretary of Agriculture," and held this post
from 1947 until 1992.243 He encouraged the USDA to pursue the means
necessary to eradicate pests and advocated widespread pesticide application
to accomplish this goal. 2"
The first backlash against unremitting pesticide application was seen in
the late 1950s, in response to federal government campaigns against the
gypsy moth and fire ants. 245 The most dramatic public backlash began in
235 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1978) (citing 119 CONG. REC.
42,913 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1973) (statement of Rep. Dingell)).236 ld. at 185.
23 Act of Apr. 26, 1910, ch.191, 36 Stat. 331 (repealed 1947).
238 Act of Oct. 21, 1947, 61 Stat. 163.
219 CHRISTOPHER J. Bosso, PESTICIDES & POLITICS 21 (1987).
240 Id. at 34 (noting that few groups understood the potential effects of widespread use).
241 Id. at 65-70 (describing how the seniority of Southern Democrats, who were generally
against pesticide regulation, allowed them to lead various committees).
242 Id. at 67.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 69.
245 Id. at 81-94. Several groups complained about the gypsy moth program's use of DDT
suspended in oil, which led to high fish kills in northern states. Similarly, groups were con-
cerned about the application of Dieldrin in high concentrations to fight the so-called fire ant
"threat."
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1962 with The New Yorker's publication of three articles by Rachel Carson,
arguing that pesticides were over-used and that their effects were poorly
understood. 246 The resulting public debate pitted scientist against scientist,
who argued over the benefits and hazards of pesticide usage. 147 In the fol-
lowing years, pesticide regulation and reform came to the fore, and resulted
in the 1964 FIFRA amendments, which required registration numbers for
pesticides and eliminated the "protest registration," which had allowed
chemical makers to keep a product on the market while protesting cancella-
tion.2 4s Also important was the fact that environmental concerns entered into
the debate in 1964, though they had had no place in the 1947 legislation.2 4 9
The Act, which would become FIFRA, was significantly amended in
1972. FIFRA came into being in its current form after the nation's exper-
iences with DDT and other toxic pesticides.2 5 0 The effort to reform FIFRA
responded in part to the delays EPA faced when it sought removal of certain
pesticides from the market. 5' Although the 1972 FIFRA amendments
brought environmental concerns into the purview of pesticide regulation,
such concerns were more of an afterthought to an already established licens-
ing program designed to protect consumers from ineffective and fraudulent
products. In fact, the legislative history of the 1972 FIFRA makes clear that
the amendments were not seen primarily as environmental in nature, but
instead were seen as a balancing between the importance of pesticides to
securing the nation's food supply and the risks pesticides pose to humans or
the environment. 252 Although Congress recognized the risks of pesticides,
which are by definition intended to kill or disrupt living organisms, Con-
gress never intended, nor did it design, FIFRA to reduce pesticide use. 253
As is evident from FIFRA's legislative history, the Act started as a clas-
sic consumer protection act aimed at ensuring that pesticide products were
not mislabeled or adulterated. Although the 1972 revisions to the Act
brought environmental considerations into the FIFRA's purview, such con-
siderations were never the Act's primary focus. Moreover, it is clear from
FIFRA itself, as well as its legislative history and judicial interpretation, that
economic and social considerations, such as concerns for farmer profit, de-
sire for cheap and safe food available to consumers, and concerns over pest
vector-borne public health diseases, are equally important to environmental
considerations under the Act.254 Moreover, FIFRA is not designed to reduce
246 Id. at 115.
24 71 d. at 121.
248 id. at 127.
249 Id.
250 S. Rin,. No. 92-970, at 9 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092, 4093 (dis-
cussing the need for reforming the federal schematics for pesticide regulation).
251 Id. at 9, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4094.
252 S. REP. No. 92-838, at 4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3995-96.
253 Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 392 (1993).
254 See McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 1979) (providing that FIFRA is aimed
not only at environmental goals, but also the economic interests of farmers and consumers).
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pesticide usage or to encourage the use of lower risk pesticides. FIFRA and
the ESA were adopted in response to very different problems and in differ-
ent political climates. Thus, the statutes seek to achieve different, and some-
times conflicting, goals.
B. Conflicting Standards
One of the most significant conflicts between the ESA and FIFRA is
their different standards governing regulatory action. FIFRA involves a bal-
ancing of the risks associated with the use of the pesticide against the social
and economic benefits to society accruing from its use. The ESA, on the
other hand, prohibits "takes" of threatened and endangered species, elimi-
nating from consideration any economic or other benefits from the pro-
scribed activities. The section 7 consultation mandates ensure that federal
agency actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of a threatened and
endangered species. Accordingly, the very terms of the statutes have created
a catch-22 situation for EPA. If EPA follows the FIFRA cost-benefit stan-
dard, it may approve a pesticide that jeopardizes a threatened or endangered
species. Accordingly, it may be in violation of the ESA. On the other hand,
if EPA chooses to comply with the ESA and deny or severely restrict a regis-
tration, EPA could be vulnerable to legal challenges for not properly imple-
menting its FIFRA mandate.
Moreover, because pesticides are by their very nature intended to kill
organisms in the environment, and because there is habitat for more than
1800 listed species throughout a wide and vast range of territory of the
United States, strict compliance with the ESA under FIFRA as it now stands
likely would require EPA to ban or severely restrict a large majority of regis-
tered pesticides. Such an interpretation would lead to the ESA virtually
swallowing up FIFRA. This dilemma is likely a large contributor to EPA's
ongoing reluctance to comply with the ESA in implementing its pesticide
registration program. The only reconcilable approach under the existing
laws appears to be to impose detailed label instructions for each pesticide in
each geographic location in which that pesticide may adversely affect a
listed species through the FIFRA labeling mechanisms. Unfortunately, this
approach is extremely unwieldy and, as described above, could result in
lengthy and complex label instructions that are unlikely to be obeyed. Con-
sequently, the existing FIFRA structure is simply a poor fit with the man-
dates of the ESA.
It should be noted that FIFRA does provide EPA with limited express
authority to take certain regulatory action to protect listed species. Specifi-
cally, as described above, section 6(c) of FIFRA authorizes EPA to suspend
the registration of a pesticide "if necessary to prevent an imminent hazard
during the time required for a cancellation" proceeding.255 FIFRA section
2(1) defines the term imminent hazard to include, among other things, a "sit-
255 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1) (2000).
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uation... when the continued use of a pesticide during the time required for
cancellation proceeding ... will involve unreasonable hazard to the survival
of a species declared endangered or threatened by the Secretary pursuant to
the Endangered Species Act of 1973. .... 1"26 Under this standard, EPA
clearly has the authority to suspend a registration to address hazards to listed
species. Although Congress included a clear expression of its intent that risk
to listed species is a basis for suspending a pesticide, Congress did not ex-
press any such intent regarding how such risks should be addressed in regis-
tration or cancellation decisions. While EPA clearly has the authority to
"consider" risks to listed species under the "unreasonable adverse effects"
standard for registration and cancellation, Congress has not indicated that
such risks in themselves would provide a basis for registration denial or
cancellation, as it did with regard to suspension.
As with the ESA, the MBTA's standards are not easily reconcilable
with those of FIFRA. The MBTA imposes a strict liability standard for
"takes" of migratory birds. 257 Courts have applied this strict liability stan-
dard to pesticide-related bird deaths. 258 This strict liability standard is in di-
rect conflict with the explicit balancing decisions required for FIFRA
pesticide registration. As one author has stated, "regular repeated bird kills
might . . . [be] tolerated had the benefits of the pesticide in question been
greater."25 9 Moreover, as with the ESA, and as others have noted, pesticide
labeling under FIFRA does not protect birds from poisoning.260
C. Conflicting Geographic and Temporal Focus
In addition to the conflicting standards of the ESA and FIFRA, the
differing focuses of the two statutes create incompatibility. FIFRA creates a
national registration process, while the ESA, which is geographically and
temporally focused, evaluates individual actions' impact on a specific habitat
and species. The ESA is concerned with preventing injury to individual
members of each listed species and preventing significant modifications to
their habitats. The ESA is also concerned with preventing injury to desig-
nated critical habitats, which by their very nature are geographically defined.
On the other hand, under the current FIFRA, a decision on whether to
register or cancel a pesticide is made on a nationwide basis without any real
consideration of specific geographic or temporal factors. For example, a
particular pesticide may easily meet the cost-benefit registration standard
because on a nationwide basis the benefits of the pesticide exceed the envi-
256 Id. § 136(1).
257 See Mineau, supra note 173, at 330.
218 United Sates v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Corbin,
444 F.Supp. 510, 536 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
259 Mineau, supra note 173, at 332.
260 See id. at 337-38. Mineau concludes that because the MBTA's provisions relate only to
direct, lethal pesticide exposures, they do not fully address the problem. Id. at 335. The author
concludes that pesticide labeling on its own fails to protect migratory birds. Id. at 337-38.
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ronmental or health costs. However, this decision ignores the fact that the
pesticide may pose substantial risks to a particular listed species that nests in
a particular geographic location during certain times of the year. Although
in theory, such geographic and temporal concerns could be addressed
through label restrictions directing users not to use the pesticide in certain
geographic locations during certain times of the year, the reality is that they
would be extremely unwieldy. It would be extremely unlikely that EPA
could require such detailed label restrictions on every pesticide product to
address every geographic or temporal restriction needed to protect every
listed species in the entire United States. Moreover, even if EPA did require
such detailed label restrictions, it is unlikely that a pesticide user would take
the time to read these complex restrictions, determine which if any restric-
tions apply to the user's intended use in a given location and at a particular
time for each and every listed species that may be affected, let alone actually
comply with such restrictions. Moreover, monitoring users to ensure they
comply with the label restrictions and enforcing against those who did not
would be virtually impossible. Accordingly, the conflicting focuses of the
statutes contributed to EPA's difficulty in finding a workable way to comply
with the wildlife protection laws.
D. Conflicting Methods
Finally, the ESA and FIFRA are inconsistent in that they provide for
very different risk reduction methods. Under the ESA, the FWS or NMFS
will issue, as part of a BiOp, reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid
jeopardy and an incidental take statement, which identifies actions that will
not be considered to be prohibited takings. The incidental take statement
specifies the reasonable and prudent measures that must be implemented to
minimize risk of takes. These measures typically are very detailed, species-
specific, and geographically and temporally defined. As described above,
FIFRA's mechanism for regulating use of pesticides to reduce risk is label
restrictions. Because of the large number of reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives and measures likely to be recommended by the Services for virtually
every pesticide as well as the complexity of many reasonable and prudent
alternatives, implementing them through labeling is impracticable and un-
likely to result in widespread compliance.
VI. THE SOLUTION
Due to the conflicting nature of many aspects of the ESA and FIFRA,
the best chance of resolving the problem is through legislative reform. As
described above, although the statutes conflict, they are not inherently irrec-
oncilable. This section proposes several legislative changes that would re-
solve the problem. As discussed in detail below, the proposed revisions to
FIFRA include (1) changing FIFRA's unreasonable adverse effects standard
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to an "overriding benefits" standard; (2) requiring registration applicants to
demonstrate actual benefits of the pesticide; (3) mandating that EPA con-
sider the comparative risks and benefits of alternative pest control methods,
including non-chemical pest control, when making registration and cancella-
tion decisions; (4) providing EPA with the authority to require localized de-
cision-making to take into account geographic and temporal considerations
of the particular pesticide use; and (5) mandating that EPA expand its data
requirements to address a wider array of risks and costs of pesticide use.
With the proposed statutory revisions, EPA would have the authority and
statutory tools necessary to provide greater protection to wildlife without
creating the economic, agricultural, and public health impacts that would
result from large numbers of pesticide cancellations.
The basic standards and structure of FIFRA have been in existence
without significant change since 1972. Experience has shown that many of
its provisions are unworkable.2 6' As described above, the judiciary's attempt
to resolve the conflict between the statutes is limited by the legislative man-
dates in the statutes themselves.
Congress enacted the ESA approximately one year after FIFRA, and it
could thus be argued that Congress intended the more draconian provisions
of the ESA to supersede the cost-benefit standard of FIFRA with regard to
pesticides that adversely affect listed species. However, Congress has never
made its intent clear. Legislative amendment of FIFRA could not only clar-
ify that the cost-benefit standard of FIFRA does not trump the ESA standard,
but could also set forth a clear articulation of how Congress intends the two
statutes to be reconciled.
In a previous article, I proposed a number of changes to FIFRA to make
it more compatible with the theory of eco-pragmatism and to provide greater
ecological protection. 62 Eco-pragmatism is a framework for environmental
decision-making developed by Professor Daniel Farber as a way to achieve a
workable middle ground between absolutist environmental protection and
strict cost-benefit balancing. Eco-pragmatism provides a rationale for mov-
ing beyond the exclusive goal of economic efficiency, focusing instead on
26' Despite the significant human health and environmental impacts that result each year
from the release of pesticides into the environment and the complexity of pesticide regulation
under FIFRA, legal scholars have paid very little attention to pesticide regulation. One rela-
tively recent article analyzing FIFRA proposes a revised approach to pesticide regulation,
shifting away from a risk-based effects analysis to a cause-based approach. Hornstein, supra
note 253, at 372 (describing environmental regulatory theories; challenging the individual yet
conceding the aggregate benefits of pesticide use; and proposing statutory reforms, including
integrated pest management and government oversight to assist farmers). Beginning with this
framework, Hornstein then discusses FIFRA, noting at the outset that despite the fact that
pesticides are inherently toxic, FIFRA is not designed to reduce pesticide usage.
262 For a complete discussion of the application of eco-pragmatism to FIFRA, see Angelo,
supra note 59, at 112-44. For a discussion of this theory, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER,
ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(1999).
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attempting to reduce human and environmental risks to the extent feasible. 263
In my previous article, I concluded that a number of revisions were needed
to make FIFRA more eco-pragmatic. First, the prevailing interpretation of
FIFRA's "unreasonable adverse effects standard" as mandating strict cost-
benefit balancing should be readjusted to be more of a feasibility-based
"overriding benefits" standard, as contemplated by FIFRA's drafters. Sec-
ond, registration applicants should be required to demonstrate the benefits of
a pesticide by demonstrating efficacy and by comparison to other available
pest control methods. Third, EPA should be given the authority to require
localized decision-making about which pesticide is best and to determine the
maximum level of environmental protection that is feasible for any given
situation. Fourth, to account for the uncertainties and long-term effects of
pesticides on the environment, a low discount rate should be used in con-
ducting the open-ended balancing analysis. Fifth, in order to ensure that
pesticides released into the environment do not undermine a baseline of eco-
logical integrity, FIFRA's data requirements should be strengthened to re-
quire information about potential effects on a wider variety of wildlife
species, as well as ecological services such as pollination, decomposition,
and nitrogen fixation. Finally, an adaptive management approach should be
developed to allow for flexibility and adjustments to the choice of pest con-
trol method appropriate for a given situation, and to allow for fine-tuning
and adjustment as circumstances change and new information becomes
available.
Many of those proposed changes would not only be consistent with
eco-pragmatic theory, but would also go a long way toward reconciling the
conflicting goals, standards, and mechanisms of FIFRA and the ESA. One
of the most important revisions is a change in the standard for pesticide
registration. EPA's cost-benefit balancing approach is not necessarily dic-
tated by FIFRA. Nothing in the language of FIFRA mandates a strict cost-
benefit balancing; FIFRA merely directs EPA to "take into account" eco-
nomic and social as well as environmental considerations. 264 As Professor
William Rodgers has described it, Congress intended the "unreasonable ad-
verse effects" language to be an environmentally stringent standard for re-
gistration.265 The Senate Commerce Committee, which drafted the language,
described it as not tolerating any adverse effects "unless there are overriding
benefits from the use of a pesticide. 2 66 It thus appears that the Senate draft-
ers intended that registration would be permitted only where any environ-
263 See generally SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 59 (providing much of the justifica-
tion for a pragmatic approach to environmental law that Farber's book was criticized for
lacking).
264 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000) (defining the term "unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment" as "taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs and bene-
fits of the use of any pesticide").
265 RODGERS, supra note 59, at 451.
2 6 6 Id. (quoting S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PESTICIDE CONTROL
ACT OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-970, at 11 (1972)).
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mental or human health risks were outweighed by "overriding benefits,"
such as where a particular pesticide is important to fighting a significant
public health problem and where other less risky control alternatives are not
available or are too costly, where a particular pesticide is necessary to the
maintenance of a segment of agriculture, or where non-chemical or less
risky alternatives are not available and to grow the crop without the pesticide
would result in severe economic losses or dramatically increased food
prices. Nevertheless, EPA's cost-benefit balancing approach has been used
for decades and endorsed by numerous administrative and judicial deci-
sions.267 Such a revision would in effect force EPA to apply the standard
originally contemplated by the Congress in enacting FIFRA in 1972. Subse-
quent to the DDT cancellation, EPA brought a number of cancellation and
suspension actions, through which the agency's interpretation of the statutory
standard "unreasonable effects on man and the environment" was further
developed. 268 These cases cemented EPA's interpretation of FIFRA as con-
taining a cost-benefit balancing standard, rather than the open-ended balanc-
ing standard that, at least arguably, it was intended to be. Accordingly, if a
pesticide poses a great economic benefit, high risks to vulnerable species,
including listed species, will be tolerated. Under this approach, even a very
high risk pesticide may not trigger cancellation if the economic benefits to
be achieved are very high. Thus, the manner in which EPA applies the "un-
reasonable adverse effects" standard as a strict cost-benefit standard is not
sufficient to protect species. A legislative fix is warranted to set the standard
that would apply when EPA is deciding whether to register or cancel a pesti-
cide that may have adverse affects on a listed species.
To accomplish the species protection goals of the ESA, while still ac-
knowledging the critical role that some pesticides play in providing for a
safe and affordable food supply, or in protecting the public from serious
diseases such as West Nile Virus that are carried and spread though insect or
other pest vectors, an alternative standard to the absolutist standard of the
ESA or the cost/benefit standard of FIFRA is required. The most logical
FIFRA revision would be to return to the standard that the framers of the
1972 FIFRA amendments apparently intended, that high-risk pesticides may
only be registered if there are overriding public health, social or economic
benefits that justify registration. If FIFRA were amended to make clear that
only overriding benefits could outweigh significant environmental risks,
then potential registrants would face a more stringent standard and pesticides
that posed significant risk would not routinely be registered.
267 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (affirming
cancellation of certain uses of heptachlor and chlordane); In re Chapman Chem. Co., I E.A.D.
199 (EPA 1976) (canceling certain uses of mercury in pesticides based on a finding that the
risks of continued use outweighed the benefits); In re Protexall Prods., Inc., 2 E.A.D. 854 (EPA
1989) (describing the registrant's burden in challenging a proposed cancellation as requiring a
showing that the "benefits of continued use justify the risks").
268 See sources cited supra note 267.
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Using this standard, economic and social benefits derived from use of
the pesticide would be considered, but would not be the ultimate determin-
ing factors in deciding whether a pesticide should be registered or not. In-
stead, for a pesticide that is likely to result in jeopardy to threatened or
endangered species to be registered or to maintain its registration, the bene-
fits of the use of the pesticide must be "overriding." Overriding benefits
would include the necessity of the pesticide to protect human health from a
serious public health threat (such as from an epidemic of an insect-borne
disease), or its necessity to the production of important food or fiber crops.
The mere fact that crop production would be more costly without the partic-
ular pesticide, however, would not in itself be considered an overriding ben-
efit warranting the registration of the pesticide.
FIFRA must be changed not only to impose the overriding benefit stan-
dard, but also to direct EPA to determine the actual benefits of a pesticide
prior to registration. Obviously, in order to make a determination of whether
a particular pesticide will provide overriding benefits, it will be necessary
for EPA to actually conduct benefits analysis. At least with regard to the
registration of pesticides, EPA's analysis is not a true cost-benefit analysis
because it does not require applicants to demonstrate the efficacy or other
benefits of the pesticide. As discussed above, FIFRA does not mandate, and
EPA has opted not to require the efficacy data to be provided when register-
ing a pesticide. EPA has, by rule, waived all requirements to submit efficacy
data except in circumstances where there is a claim that the pesticide con-
trols pest microorganisms that pose a threat to human health or vertebrates
that may directly or indirectly transmit diseases to humans.2 69 Moreover, at
the time of making the registration decision, EPA does not determine
whether more efficacious alternatives, including non-chemical alternatives
or other lower risk alternatives, exist.2 70 Similarly, EPA does not require
applicants to demonstrate that the pesticide is more beneficial, either envi-
ronmentally or economically, than other existing pesticides or pest control
methods available to control the target pest. Instead, EPA acts on the as-
sumptions that a pesticide manufacturer would not incur the costs of devel-
oping and marketing a pesticide if the pesticide did not work, and that any
pesticides that are not beneficial will be eliminated through market forces.2 7'
Consequently, pesticides are registered without any finding that they work
for their intended purposes, that they are necessary for addressing particular
pests, or that existing chemical or non-chemical alternatives are unavailable
26940 C.F.R. § 158.640 (2007). EPA has reserved the right to require, on a case-by-case
basis, submission of efficacy data for other pesticides.
270 Many safe and effective alternatives to chemical pesticides are available, including
botanicals, microbials, minerals, beneficial insects, organic farming practices and cultural con-
trols. See CBD Report, supra note 14, at 60.
271 Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act, Proposed Registration, Reregistration and Classification Procedures, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,659,
40,661 (Sept. 15, 1982).
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or infeasible. Because virtually no chemical pesticide is without at least
some risk, it is probable that at least some pesticides are registered that pose
some risks, but have not been demonstrated to have any significant environ-
mental, economic or societal benefit.
EPA does not consider the benefits of the pesticide and whether there
are viable alternatives available until it begins to consider whether to cancel
that pesticide's registration. In determining whether to proceed with cancel-
lation, EPA must make a threshold determination that the risks posed by a
pesticide are significant. Only after such determination is made does EPA
proceed to a full cost-benefit analysis, considering, among other things, the
economic and social benefits associated with the use of the pesticide. How-
ever, when conducting this benefits analysis, EPA's consideration of alterna-
tives is typically limited to looking at other registered pesticides for the same
use (which are assumed to be efficacious if they are registered). EPA typi-
cally does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of non-chemical alterna-
tive pest control techniques such as cultural control, biological control or
organic farming practices. Moreover, when considering the availability of
existing chemical alternatives, EPA does not conduct a comparative risk
analysis of the pesticide proposed for cancellation against existing available
pesticides. As a result, the order in which pesticides are identified for can-
cellation determines which pesticide will remain registered, regardless of the
relative risks of such pesticides. For instance, a moderate risk pesticide may
be cancelled because other alternatives exist. As more pesticides are can-
celled over time, however, the benefits of the remaining registered pesticides
grow. Thus, eventually the benefits of the "last pesticide standing" will be
very high because no alternatives will exist at that point, and the benefits of
that pesticide will very likely outweigh the risks, even if the risks are rela-
tively high. Accordingly, this pesticide will retain its registration even
though it has higher relative risks than previously cancelled pesticides, sim-
ply by virtue of it being the last pesticide in the queue considered for cancel-
lation. This result could be solved by requiring a true benefits analysis for
each registered pesticide, including a consideration of non-chemical alterna-
tives, and conducting a relative risk analysis that compares the risks of pesti-
cides targeted at the same pest. Without a comparative analysis of
alternatives, it is impossible to determine whether a particular pesticide has
benefits (other than financial benefits for the manufacturer). If lower-risk
and similarly efficacious alternatives to a particular pesticide are available
and economically and technically feasible, then the pesticide does not pro-
vide the type of overriding benefits that would justify continued registration
and continued risk.
It is worth noting that although EPA does not routinely consider the
relative risks of alternative pesticides when making registration or cancella-
tion decisions, it has attempted to encourage the development and registra-
tion of lower-risk pesticides as a matter of policy. For example, in 1997,
EPA issued a notice setting forth its policy for the expedited review of re-
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duced-risk conventional pesticides and biological pesticides.112 The policy is
intended to encourage the development, registration and use of lower-risk
pesticide products "which would result in reduced risks to human health and
the environment when compared to existing alternatives." '73 To accomplish
this goal, EPA provides the incentive of an expedited registration review for
pesticides that may reasonably be expected to accomplish one or more of the
following: "(i) reduce the risks of pesticides to human health; (ii) reduce the
risks of pesticides to nontarget organisms; (iii) reduce the potential for con-
tamination of groundwater, surface water, or other valued environmental re-
sources; and (iv) broaden the adoption of integrated pest management
strategies .. ".. ,274 Nevertheless, although EPA does provide some incen-
tives to encourage the development of lower risk pesticide, EPA continues to
interpret and implement the "unreasonable adverse effects" standard in a
way that not only fails to encourage the use of lower risk pesticides, but also
may in some cases actually discourage lower risk products.
Another change necessary to ensure species protection is a reevaluation
of pesticide registration data requirements to address more wildlife and eco-
logical effects. EPA's analyses of the "costs" of pesticide use, although
more complete than analyses of benefits, do not fully address the array of
environmental or economic harms posed by pesticides. 275 Environmental
and economic costs that EPA does not typically address sufficiently in its
cost-benefit analyses include domestic animal poisonings and contaminated
products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, honeybee
and wild bee poisonings and reduced pollination, crop and product loss,
ground and surface water contamination, fishery losses, adverse effects on
wild birds and mammals, adverse effects on microorganisms and in-
vertebrates, and adverse effects on ecosystem services. These costs are sub-
stantial and if considered could radically alter the outcome of the cost-
benefit analysis. For example, in 1993, Cornell Professor David Pimentel
estimated that if the full environmental and social costs of pesticide use,
including indirect effects, are taken into account, they would be approxi-
mately $8 billion/year.2 76 Further, Pimentel notes that because many addi-
tional costs of pesticide use are either not well understood or difficult to
272 This policy was developed partially in response to the 1996 Food Quality Protection
Act mandates to develop procedures and guidelines for expedited pesticide review, and super-
sedes EPA's prior reduced-risk criteria. EPA, Guidelines for Expedited Review of Conven-
tional Pesticides Under the Reduced-Risk Initiative and for Biological Pesticides' P.R. Notice
92-3 (Sept. 4, 1997) [hereinafter EPA Guidelines for Expedited Review], available at http://
www.epa.gov/PR-Notices/pr97-3.html.
273 Id.
274 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(10)(B) (2000). EPA has further interpreted these criteria to develop
a list of factors that will most significantly contribute to EPA's decision to grant reduced-risk
status. EPA Guidelines for Expedited Review, supra note 272, at 3-4.
275 See generally Pimentel, supra note 18, at 47-73.
2 7 6
ld. at 72.
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quantify, the true cost of pesticide use many be substantially higher than his
$8 billion estimate. These issues must enter into EPA's analysis. 277
One step toward improving EPA's protection of wildlife would be to
revise the data requirements to better evaluate the full range of risks to wild-
life species, including ESA listed species and those protected by other wild-
life protection laws.278 Moreover, to the extent that EPA's current data
requirements do include some studies designed to evaluate risks to fish,
wildlife, aquatic organisms, and non-target insects, EPA's primary purpose in
requiring such studies is not to determine whether to register a pesticide
product, but instead is to "provide data which determines the need for (and
appropriate wording for) precautionary label statements to minimize the po-
tential adverse effects to nontarget organisms. '27 9 As described above, how-
ever, precautionary label statements cannot in themselves provide sufficient
protection against the environmental harms resulting from pesticides use. A
better way to regulate pesticide use is needed.
Improved data requirements themselves will not result in reduced risks
if EPA continues to use data merely to provide warnings and precautions on
product labels. Instead, the improved data should be used to make unreason-
able adverse effects determinations required at the time of registration. EPA
should refuse to register (or at least demand appropriate risk reduction mea-
sures for) a pesticide if the data indicate the pesticide poses a high level of
risk to wildlife.
Perhaps the most significant proposed change to FIFRA is to create a
mechanism for regulating pesticide use based on localized decision-mak-
ing. 28 0 Such decision-making can take into account geographic location of
species, migratory patterns, nesting and breeding patterns, and other local
277 Id.
278 Currently, EPA's data requirements for pesticide registration only address some of
these concerns. The minimum data requirements for registration, experimental use permits,
and reregistration are set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 158 (2007). More detailed standards for con-
ducting tests, guidance on evaluation, and reporting of data and additional guidance are pro-
vided in a series of advisory documents that EPA makes available to applicants and the public.
See id. § 158.20(c). In its data requirement rules, EPA identifies some data as required and
other data as "conditionally required." Conditionally required data are required only if the
product's proposed pattern of use, results of other tests, or other factors meet the criteria speci-
fied in the rules. See id. §§ 158.25(a), 158.101. EPA's rules also allow certain data require-
ments to be waived if they are not applicable to the particular pesticide or use. See id.
§ 158.25(b) (setting forth policy on flexibility and waiver); id. § 158.35 (describing the flexi-
bility in data requirements); and id. § 158.45 (discussing waiver of data requirements). In
addition, EPA's rules set forth varying data requirements for minor use of a pesticide - i.e.,
used on a minor crop - and biochemical and microbial pesticides. See id. §§ 158.60 and
158.65, respectively.
279 Id. § 158.202(h)(1).
280 Professor J.B. Ruhl has also noted that one of the most significant shortcomings of
FIFRA is its lack of an adequate mechanism for regulating pesticide use. See Ruhl, supra note
25, at 310-11. Contrasting this regulatory system with those found under the Clean Water Act
and Clean Air Act, Ruhl argues that the system, with its lack of permits, performance stan-
dards, public reporting requirements or pesticide monitoring system, lacks any comprehensive
framework for regulating pesticide use in particular places or at particular times. Id. at 311.
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conditions. Currently, FIFRA does not provide a mechanism for localized
decision-making regarding the risks of certain pesticides and for deciding if
their use should be precluded in certain areas or in certain manners.2 81
A shift to localized decision-making could be carried out by a permit-
ting system for large-scale releases of pesticides into the environment. An
expert regulatory agency (either federal or state) could evaluate local condi-
tions and then impose Service-recommended reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives from a BiOp as permit conditions for the application. Such permit
conditions could include buffers around habitat, water bodies, and nests, dur-
ing certain times of years to avoid migration, breeding or nesting, and re-
strictions on spraying under certain weather conditions (e.g., high winds or
heavy rain) , and any other condition that would reduce the risk of harm to
listed species or migratory birds.
Once a pesticide is registered under the proposed overriding benefits
standard, agency oversight must be required to determine whether a particu-
lar pesticide should be allowed to be used in a particular location at a partic-
ular time and in a particular manner. This "where, when and how"
determination is necessary to ensure that even pesticides that may have over-
riding benefits, and thus, are appropriate for nationwide registration, are not
used in places, at times or in ways that jeopardize listed species or their
habitats in particular locations. This localized decision-making could be ac-
complished through a number of different mechanisms, including a permit-
ting system or the prescription approach that I have proposed elsewhere.282
Such a localized decision-making mechanism will enable EPA or the States
to implement the reasonable and prudent alternatives recommended by the
Services to avoid jeopardy and reduce risk to listed species. The Services'
BiOps will be able to contemplate such a system and therefore provide for
appropriate permit conditions and use limitations that will minimize risk,
and also provide incidental take statements to provide legal protection for
the limited takes that cannot be avoided. The consideration of local factors
in determining whether a specific pesticide use should be permitted in a
281 Ironically, although FIFRA does not contain a mechanism for consideration of local
conditions when evaluating risks posed by a pesticide, it does authorize states to take into
consideration "special local needs" to issue state registrations for pesticide uses that are not
federally registered. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c) (2000).
282 In addition to a permitting system, there are a variety of potential mechanisms availa-
ble for achieving local decision-making regarding actual pesticide use. As I described in my
previous article, one such mechanism to authorize state or local government officials to make
case-by-case, or season-by season decisions on the actual use of pesticides. For example, a
local official could be required to evaluate the local conditions, including the particular pest
concerns, the climatic conditions, the presence of listed species, and a wide variety of local
environmental factors, before "prescribing" that a particular pesticide be used. I analogized
this idea to that of a medical doctor prescribing that a patient take a particular medication.
Prior to issuing such a prescription, the doctor would consider a number of factors such as the
patient's overall health, other medical conditions, other medications the patient is taking, any
allergies or sensitivities the patient may have to certain types of medications, the patients age,
the patient's health and lifestyle objectives and the patient's willingness to accept certain risks
to achieve such goals.
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specific location at a specific time, and if so under what conditions, is of
particular import. The benefit of some type of prior approval of pesticide
use is that decisions can be made based on local factors such as the presence
of threatened, endangered or otherwise rare or sensitive species, soil condi-
tions, climatic conditions, proximity to environmentally-sensitive lands,
types of crops grown, types of farming practices used, severity of pest infes-
tations, or other relevant site-specific factors.
Currently, FIFRA does not provide for a permitting or other system to
require prior approval of pesticide use. Although under FIFRA states are
permitted to regulate and even ban federally-regulated pesticides, most states
do not have pesticide permitting systems that address the use of pesticides
under localized conditions. 2 3 In fact, most states do not require users to
obtain site-specific permits before a pesticide can be applied, even for large
scale agricultural pesticide application. 2 4 Most states do not require anyone
with specialized knowledge of the presence of threatened or endangered spe-
cies or rare or sensitive ecosystems to make any evaluation prior to the re-
lease of pesticides into the environment. Any amendment to FIFRA to
require a permitting system for large-scale application of pesticides would
necessarily require the establishment of a federal permitting system, wherein
states may choose to assume authority for the permitting program, as in the
cooperative federalism regulatory systems established in other federal envi-
ronmental laws, such as the Clean Water Act.
The benefit of the permitting system over EPA's county bulletin system
is that an expert reviewer will evaluate each application to determine the
appropriate conditions to be placed on the permit. The farmer will not be
required to know or research the locations of habitats, nests, or breeding
grounds, the migration routes, or the migration, breeding, or nesting seasons
of every listed species or migratory bird that may be affected. Even if a
pesticide applicator with the best intentions diligently seeks out the county
bulletin and attempts to fully comply with it, she may not possess the neces-
sary expertise to determine each location and timing of nesting, breeding,
migration or other behavior of each listed species and migratory bird that
23 Although FIFRA permits states to have permitting or other regulatory programs related
to pesticides, FIFRA preempts states from imposing their own labeling requirements, and re-
quires that all pesticides bear the EPA-approved label. Id. §§ 136v(a)-(b).
284 Some states do have limited permitting requirements for pesticide use, but these re-
quirements generally apply only to aerial application of pesticides and generally a permit is not
issued for each application. For example, in Hawaii, a permit is required prior to aerial appli-
cation of pesticides. See HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 4-66-64 (2004). However, the permit can be
issued for repeated uses or for a specified length of time. Id. § 4-66-64(a)(4). Consequently,
changing local environmental conditions are not likely to be adequately addressed for each
application. In Massachusetts, a permit is required for the aerial application of pesticides. See
333 MAss. CODE REGS. 13.05(3)(b) (2004). In addition, in Massachusetts a special permit is
required for application of restncted-use pesticides to an area greater than twenty-five acres.
See id. § 13.02(2). Similarly, in Vermont, one-year duration permits are required for aerial
application of pesticides. See 20-031-012 VT. CODE R. § IV(5) (2003), available at http://
www.vermontagriculture.com/ARMESVTregs91 .htm#Section%201V.
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may be in the area. Moreover, a permitting system would ensure greater
compliance than a sentence on a pesticide label telling users to access county
bulletins and follow the restrictions on such bulletins.
Under the proposed permitting system, EPA would consult with the
Services at the time of registration or re-registration for issues of nationwide
concern to see if a pesticide should be registered in the first place and for
generic warnings regarding toxicity and proper use. The consultation would
also result in the Services issuing BiOps that would set forth reasonable and
prudent alternatives that would be used as permit conditions for particular
pesticide applications in particular locations. If there are overriding benefits
that outweigh the risks posed by the use of the pesticide, EPA will issue the
registration. The reasonable and prudent alternatives from the BiOp will
become the basis for localized permitting decisions. The permitting agency
would make the decision based on geographic and temporal factors such as
whether there are threatened or endangered species using, migrating through
or breeding in the area, as well as whether less risky alternatives are availa-
ble, whether the use of particular pesticide at a particular site under particu-
lar conditions is appropriate, and whether site and use specific restrictions
based on the reasonable and prudent alternatives from the BiOp are war-
ranted. Thus, under this approach, even high toxicity pesticides could still
be registered if they have overriding benefits, but there will be oversight as
to which pesticides can be applied where, when and how.
Finally, none of the changes described above will suffice unless there is
a commitment to make endangered species protection a priority. As shown
by EPA's longstanding avoidance of its ESA responsibilities, as well as by
the recent attempts to use rulemaking to circumvent ESA compliance, the
agencies do not appear to be committed to such a priority. Clear leadership
is needed to direct the agencies to not abrogate their species protection obli-
gations merely because meeting such obligations is a difficult task. Given
the thousands of pesticide regulatory decisions made each year and the hun-
dreds of species at risk, compliance with the ESA will be a large undertak-
ing. Accordingly, both EPA and the Services must be provided with
sufficient resources to carry out the daunting task of consulting on literally
thousands of pesticides, and even more importantly, of implementing the
necessary regulatory measures to ensure that protected species are not put at
risk due to pesticide use. Strong leadership from the top is necessary so that
the agencies are clear that their mission is to make effects determinations,
carry out consultations, and implement species protection measures, rather
than spending limited resources fighting lawsuits and developing ever more
creative contortions to attempt to avoid compliance with species protection
laws.
2008]
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VII. CONCLUSION
Due to the conflicting goals, standards, focuses, and methods of United
States species protection laws and pesticide law, the agencies implementing
these laws have reached an impasse. As the battle rages, birds, fish, pol-
linators, threatened and endangered species, and other wildlife are the unwit-
ting casualties. To date, the federal agencies charged with carrying out the
mandates of the conflicting laws have done a poor job, not only of finding
ways to comply with the laws, but more importantly, in protecting at-risk
species. Although courts have attempted to resolve the problem, they too
are limited by the inherent flaws of the existing statutes. The only way to
adequately reconcile the laws, while still carrying out the goals of species
protection, a safe and affordable food supply, and public health protection, is
for Congress to amend FIFRA to eliminate the strict cost-benefit balancing
standard, to require the consideration of benefits and lower risk alternatives,
and to establish a permitting system for large-scale pesticide applications.
This would ensure proper consideration of local factors and implementation
of the reasonable and prudent alternatives recommended by the Services to
reduce the risk of harm to listed species. In addition, the Services and EPA
should coordinate to develop a process to streamline consultation, without
eliminating the vital role of the expert agencies. Finally, to properly carry
out the important mandates of the ESA, both the Services and EPA's pesti-
cide office will need adequate funding and leadership to overcome the long-
term EPA culture of evading ESA compliance and the bureaucratic inertia
and paralysis that has ensued for the past thirty-five years.
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